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'Derelicts," Recurring Misfortune, Economic
Hard Times and Lifestyle Choices:
Judicial Images of Homeless Litigants and
Implications for Legal Advocates
WES DANmiLst
I was strong, that's all I had.'
INTRODUCTION
Whether portrayed as derelicts, 2 as victims of misfortune,3
or as people burdened by structural forces beyond their control,4
the image of homeless people as reflected in most court opinions
t Professor, University of Miami School of Law. This work was greatly facilitated by
research grants provided by the University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful to my
colleagues Marc Fajer, Stephen Schnably and Susan Stefan for their close reading and
perceptive comments. Faculty colleagues who made helpful suggestions include Anthony
Alfieri, Terence Anderson, Caroline Bradley, Mary Coombs, Martha Mahoney, Bernard
Oxman, Richard Williamson and Bruce Vimick. Research assistants Johanna Eadie and
Pamela Entzel were essential: in addition to their tireless pursuit of research sources,
they made substantial intellectual contributions. Louis Archambault helped organize a
variety of disparate materials. The assistance of the University of Miami Law Library
staff was invaluable, and I particularly thank Sue Anne Campbell and Nora de la Garza
for providing everything I asked for. Pam Thomas-Hill and Andrea Calow offered high-
quality secretarial support.
Lucie White's work, always incisive and thought-provoking, continued to be a major
source of inspiration. For their advocacy on homelessness legal issues, my appreciation
goes to Steven Banks, Gary Blasi, Maria Foscarinis, Robert Hayes, Stanley Herr, Mary
Ellen Hombs, Valerie Jonas, Gale Lucy, Arthur Rosenberg, Barbara Sard, Virginia Shu-
bert, Rodney Thaxton (in memoriam), Solangel Verde, Benjamin Waxman and Stephen
Wizner.
This is dedicated to Susan, because you relieve suffering;, and to Katie and Lisa:
wherever you are, Ill always be home.
1. Hell ("[Tihat's my name. My mother called me that"), a 28-year-old Puerto Rican
homeless woman living in Philadelphia, quoted in STEVEN VANDERSTAAY, STREET LIVES:
AN ORAL HISTORY OF HoMELEss AMEICANS 72-73 (1992).
2. See Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979), reprinted in
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10 [hereinafter Callahan].
3. See Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245, 250 (W. Va. 1983) and text, infra pp. 15-
16.
4. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992), appeal
pending, 76 F3d 1154 (Fla. 1996) (ordering parties to discuss settlement). See also infra
pp. 16-22.
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is one of weakness, helplessness and despair. Such portrayals
may seem necessary to legal advocates and decision-makers who
want to find a way to provide relief to suffering people within
the narrow confines of legal doctrine.5 But these images are
hardly complete or even accurate, and their use in litigation
risks perpetuating socially harmful stereotypes and stigma. In
addition, projecting the image is becoming less successful in con-
vincing courts to rule in favor of homeless litigants. This ap-
proach, therefore, may be detrimental to those it is intended to
benefit, in both the long and the short term.
Many homeless people display great strength in the strug-
gle to survive under extraordinarily adverse conditions, in a con-
text of very limited realistic choices. 6 But the law does not gen-
erally value the strength and struggle of the poor and
victimized. In fact, as scholars have noted in a variety of areas,
legal doctrine is structured in such a way as to effectively erase
struggle.7 With no change in sight, those who want to work ef-
5. See Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for So-
cial Change, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 723, 730 (1991) (noting that "the very effort to make le-
gal arguments may require accepting assumptions and terms of debate that advocates
most deeply wish to challenge.., . particularly in arguments... on behalf of groups that
have been excluded or degraded historically).
6. "[Momelessness... points up the great resilience of people and their ability to
create networks of support and connection under the most harrowing of circumstances."
VANDERSTAAY, supra note 1, at 187. For works that describe the strength and resource-
fulness homeless people display in order to survive, see, eg., David A. Snow, et al., Mate-
rial Survival Strategies on the Street: Homeless People as Bricoleurs, in HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA 86-96 (Jim Baumohl ed., 1996); DAvID A. SNOW & LEON ANDERSON. DOWN ON
THEm Lucm. A STUDY OF HOMELESS STREET PEOPLE (1993); Kim Hopper et al., Economies
of Makeshift: Deindustrialization and Homelessness in New York City, 14 URB. ANTHRO-
.POLOGY 183 (1985); ELLIOT LmBow, TEL, THEM WHO I Am: THE LIVES OF HOMELESS Wo-
MEN (1993); KATHLEEN HIRSCH, SONGS FROM THE ALLEY (1989); JONATHAN KOZOL, RACHEL
AND HER CHILDREN: HOMELESS FAMILIEs IN AMERICA (1988); Ralph Hernandez et al., AIDS
and Homelessness: Personal Accounts, 2 YALE J.L. & Lm. 85 (1991).
7. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991), and Exit: Power and the Idea of Leav-
ing in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1283 (1992) (bat-
tered women); Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory
and Law, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 763 (1993) (women labeled mentally ill), and The Protec-
tion Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
1271 (1994) (rape victims); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills,
and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter White, Subordination] (welfare recipients). Anthony Alfieri urges poverty lawyers to
"discredit[ ] traditional images of client dependency by crediting client narratives of
daily struggle." Anthony Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning the Les-
sons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2141 (1991). He believes that the "image of
client dependency," which he considers 'the primary contradiction of the poverty lawyer's
interpretive tradition," is "contradicted by the client's public and private assertions of
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fectively with homeless people to improve their life conditions
may have to look beyond traditional lawyers' work.
The purpose of this Article is to identify the images of
homeless people and the assumptions about the causes of their
homelessness that are reflected by judges in ruling on their le-
gal claims, and to suggest implications for those who wish to
work with homeless individuals struggling to relieve their
suffering.8
The Article begins with a brief survey of the litigation un-
dertaken in the past two decades by lawyers and other advo-
cates for homeless people, in which the focus has moved from
attempting to gain public benefits to resisting the increasing use
of law enforcement to deal with widespread visible
homelessness.
The language of the cases is then analyzed. Court opinions
reflect shifts, over time, in assumptions about the cause of
homelessness: from personal dereliction, to bad luck, to struc-
tural economic forces, to lifestyle choices.
Since a central question for the courts often seems to be
whether and to what extent homelessness is "voluntary," the Ar-
ticle reviews the application of that concept to the legal claims
of homeless litigants, particularly with respect to recent Eighth
Amendment status-crime challenges. The argument that home-
less people are protected by the Constitutional ban on cruel and
unusual punishment for engaging in life-sustaining activities
they have no choice but to perform in public was initially some-
what successful. This reasoning, however, is increasingly being
rejected.
This Article notes what social scientists, the public at large,
and homeless individuals themselves believe about the causes
of, and the solutions to, homelessness. A more informed view of
power." Id. at 2134.
8. Others have examined the ways in which stereotypical assumptions about op-
pressed people affect the outcomes they can achieve through the legal process. For a
path-breaking, comprehensive, and compelling analysis in one such context, see Marc A.
Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?: Storytelling, Gender Role Stereotypes,
and Legal Protections for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MiAMu L. REv.511 (1992) (argu-
ing, generally, that consciousness of common judicial stereotypes allows advocates to de-
vise more effective methods of winning cases without reinforcing assumptions that cause
their clients harm). For other examples, see also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of
Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28
HARv. C.R-C.L. L. Rnv. 395 (1993); Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Im-
migrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993
B.Y.U. L. Rav. 1139; Peter Margulies, Difference and Distrust in Asylum Law: Haitian
and Holocaust Refugee Narratives, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 135 (1993).
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the nature of homelessness is essential for lawyers to battle ef-
fectively for its elimination.
The conclusion critiques the "involuntariness" litigation
strategy, arguing that it is ultimately ineffective in achieving
meaningfuzl solutions to the problems of homeless individuals,
whether or not it wins lawsuits. In any event, homelessness for
many may in fact be a "voluntary" choice made from a range of
unacceptable options. Lawyers, then, should consider alternative
approaches: reconceptualizing legal arguments that acknowledge
the agency that homeless people exercise, and participating in
political work to expand and improve the limited options that
constrain the exercise of that agency.
As Lucie White and others have warned, there are serious
dangers in constructing and advocating for a category of people
called the "homeless," since to do so risks diverting attention
away from individuals not literally homeless but whose shelter
problems may be equally severe.9 People officially defined as
"homeless" may even reject the label. 0 The focus here is on liti-
gation in which plaintiffs identify themselves (or their lawyers
identify them) as homeless, or respond to official categorizations
of them as homeless. The questions at issue in these lawsuits
involve applicability of legal doctrines to people who are seen to
differ from others in that they lack access to permanent
housing."
9. Lucie White, Representing "The Real Deal", 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271, 300 (1990)
[hereinafter White, The Real Deal]. See also Gary Blasi, And We Are Not Seen: Ideologi.
cal and Political Barriers to Understanding Homelessness, 37 Am. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 563,
564 (1994) [hereinafter Blasi, And We Are Not Seen] (arguing that "by redefining ex-
treme poverty in terms of homelessness, by advocating for 'the homeless' rather than for
the extremely poor... and by paying inadequate attention to questions of race, advo-
cates unwittingly harmed the ultimate cause they believed they were serving: alleviating
the human suffering that attends extreme deprivation.").
10. See April R. Veness, Neither Homed Nor Homeless: Contested Definitions and the
Personal Worlds of the Poor, 12 PoL GEOGRAPHY 319, 321 (1993) (finding that "exter-
nally-decided" definitions of "home" and "homelessness" often do not correspond to the
sense that those targeted with the "homeless" label have of those terms).
11. In addition, "[als important as it is not to lose sight of the larger issues of pov-
erty, the particular qualities of deprivation characterizing the state of literal homeless-
ness are striking." Wes Daniels, Symposium on Law and the Homeless: An Introduction,
45 U. MiAmi L. Rxv. 261, 264 (1990-1991) (noting greater problems with health, nutri-
tion, violence and death; discrimination and harassment based on living in public; school
problems of homeless children; homeless parents' fear of losing children to child welfare
authorities; and the psychologically devastating effect of life on the streets). For just a
few recent examples of violence committed against homeless people, see, for example,
Reina v. Texas, 940 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. App. 1997) (homeless person severely beaten
and set on fire in alley behind convenience store); Franklin v. Mississippi, 676 So. 2d
287, 288-89 (Miss. 1996) (sixty-one-year-old homeless man living in a field behind a res-
690 [Vol. 45
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I. THE AGE(S) OF HOMELESS LIGATION. A VERY BRIEF SURVEY
Litigation concerning rights of individuals we might call
homeless certainly predates 1979.12 But an opinion issued that
year by a New York trial court, Callahan v. Carey,13 is often said
to mark the beginning of an era in which lawyers consciously
set out to use lawsuits to improve living conditions for homeless
individuals.14
The earliest cases focused on attempts to establish a right
taurant attacked by five teenagers, who threw rocks and bricks at him and kicked him
for five to seven minutes; he was then fatally shot in the back of the head by one of the
youths); Gail Epstein, A Mismatch on Wheels Turns Fatal, MIAM HERALD, Oct. 12, 1996,
at BI (truck driver intentionally drives 18-wheeler into homeless man in wheelchair,
knocking him off his wheelchair and crushing his head with the front tire, killing him
instantly).
Another potential danger of identifying a category called "homeless" is that it un-
realistically homogenizes a group of individuals whose characteristics, circumstances and
stories may be very different. See, eg., Susan Gonzalez Baker, Gender, Ethnicity, and
Homelessness: Accounting for Demographic Diversity on the Streets, 37 AM. BEHAV. SCIEN-
TISr 476 (1994) (examining diversity among the homeless along the dimensions of gender
and ethnicity and noting a heterogeneity among the homeless population unprecedented
in U.S. history). However, attempts to portray the homeless as "just like you or me" in
order to garner sympathy for their "plight" have been criticized as ignoring the reality
that what the homeless have in common is extreme poverty. In addition, for many of
"us" who may be "one paycheck away" from becoming homeless, our life histories, condi-
tions, and access to sources of support in times of difficulty make it unlikely that "we"
will ever really consider ourselves as just like "them!
There also are important race, ethnicity and gender dimensions to the homelessness
issue that are beyond the scope of this Article to address fully. For a call for increased
focus on the race dimension, see Kim Hopper, Taking the Measure of Homelessness: Re-
cent Research on Scale and Race, 29 CLEARiNGHOUSE REV. 730 (1995). For an analysis of
one aspect of the gender dimension, see Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and
Homelessness, 3 J.L. & POLy 237 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (California statute
criminalizing the importation of indigent people into the state is an invalid exercise of
police power which imposes an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce);
Headley v. Selkowitz, 171 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1965) (vagrancy statute, even if facially
valid, should not be applied to "innocent victims of misfortune... who are not [va-
grants] either by choice or intentional conduct.").
13. Callahan, supra note 2.
14. See Mixon v. Grinker, 595 N.Y.S.2d 876, 879-80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (reflecting
on earlier cases and finding, "the current provisions for housing the homeless resulted
not from initiatives of the Executive or Legislature, but rather are the results of litiga-
tion."); see also MARY ELLEN HoiBs, AMERICAN HOmLEsSNESS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK
(2d ed. 1994); Gary Blasi & James Preis, Litigation on Behalf of the Homeless, in HOME-
LESSNESS A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 309, 310, 318 & 320 n.7 (Marjorie J. Robertson &
Milton Greenblat eds. 1992); Rene I. Jahiel, M.D., Ph.D., Preventive Approaches to Home-
lessness, in HOMELESSNESS A PREVENTION-ORiENTED APPROACH 11, 18-19 (Rene I. Jahiel
ed. 1992).
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to emergency shelter.15 Callahan opened a wedge to expand
emergency shelter opportunities for homeless men in New
York.16 Lawyers then convinced courts to rule that if the City
was providing emergency shelter to homeless men, whether or
not constitutionally or statutorily mandated, it could not deny
similar shelter to homeless women 17 or families. 18 Further, if
shelter were offered, it would have to meet minimal habitability
standards, including freedom from significant health threats.19
For example, the placement in mass shelters of particularly vul-
nerable individuals, such as "tiny babies and pregnant
mothers" 20 was held to cause irreparable harm sufficient to en-
join such placements, and to entitle those individuals to a differ-
ent type of emergency shelter.
Shelter rights were established in places other than New
York on the basis of various state and local statutory provisions.
In St. Louis, for example, attorneys representing homeless cli-
ents used a broadly-worded state statute mandating assistance
to the poor 21 to induce the City to agree to a consent judgment 22
requiring the City to create new emergency shelter space, to
provide additional permanent housing units, and to operate a
reception center and a day center for homeless women, children
and families.23 Litigants in Philadelphia achieved a settlement
establishing a right to shelter under local law2 4
In West Virginia, homeless advocates convinced the state
Supreme Court that their clients were among the intended ben-
eficiaries of an adult protective services statute, requiring the
15. See, eg., McCain v. Koch, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986-87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); El-
dredge v. Koch, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960, 961 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303
S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983); Callahan, supra note 2.
16. See Callahan, supra note 2.
17. Eldredge, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
18. McCain, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987-88.
19. See, eg., Barnes v. Koch, 518 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987); McCain,
484 N.Y.S.2d at 987 (a court has the power to issue a preliminary injunction requiring
city agencies to provide emergency housing for homeless families that meets the mini-
mum standards of sanitation, safety and decency); but see Mixon v. Grinker, 627
N.Y.S.2d 668, 674-75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (per curiam), rev'd, 646 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662-63
(N.Y. 1996).
20. Slade v. Koch, 514 N.Y.S.2d 847, 852 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
21. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 205.580 (1949) ("Poor persons shall be relieved, maintained and
supported by the county of which they are inhabitants).
22. Graham v. Schoemehl, No. 854-00035 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 15, 1985).
23. Kenneth M. Chackes, Sheltering the Homeless: Judicial Enforcement of Govern-
mental Duties to the Poor, 31 WASH. U. J. URs. & CoNTEmp. L. 155, 185-86 (1987).
24. HOMBS, supra note 14, at 129 (citing Committee for Dignity and Fairness for the
Homeless v. Pernsley, No. 886 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, 1985)).
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state to provide them emergency shelter, food and medical
care.2
A series of California cases successfully challenged bureau-
cratic obstacles that impeded homeless individuals' access to
public emergency shelter.26 Through consent judgments or court
orders, counties were prevented om requiring documentation
of identity27 or an address,28 and were required to provide spe-
cial assistance to mentally or developmentally disabled appli-
cants in completing a complex and confusing application and in-
take process. 29
Other cases established rights to housing-related govern-
ment assistance. Some state courts held that public benefit pro-
grams, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, enti-
tled qualified recipients to payment levels high enough to allow
them to afford adequate shelter,30 or at least to computations of
standards of need that accurately reflected the true cost of
housing.3 1
25. Hodge, 303 S.E.2d 245. Washington, D.C. voters, through a 1984 ballot initiative
called the District of Columbia Right to Overnight Shelter Act, created for "[all persons
... the right to adequate overnight shelter." D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-601 (1988). In 1990,
however, the City Council removed by amendment any entitlement to overnight shelter.
D.C. Emergency Overnight Shelter Amend. Act of 1990, D.C. Law 8-197, 37 D.C. Regs.
4815 (1990) (codified as D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-206.9(a) (repealed 1994) and §3-609 (re-
pealed 1994). A referendum then narrowly ratified the Council's action. Linda Wheeler,
Homeless Referendum; Shelter Referendum Loses by a Slim Margin, WASH. PosT, Nov. 7,
1990, at A33. See Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107 F3d 32, 33
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (reviewing the history of the legislation, and holding that current law
did not create a constitutionally protected entitlement to emergency family shelter).
26. See generally Gary L. Blasi, Litigation Strategies for Addressing Bureaucratic
Disentitlement, 16 N.Y.U. Rav. L. Soc. CHANGE 591 (1987-88); and Blasi & Preis, supra
note 14, at 313-15.
27. Eisenheim v. Board of Supervisors, No. C47953 (L.A. Co. Super. Ct., Dec. 20,
1983) (invalidating a requirement that applicants provide a certified birth certificate or
driver's license, as well as a General Relief quota system which controlled the number of
persons receiving emergency shelter vouchers).
28. Nelson v. Board of Supervisors of San Diego County, 190 Cal. App. 3d 25 (1987)
(striking address requirement).
29. Rensch v. Board of Supervisors, No. C595155 (L_ Co. Super. Ct. 1985).
30. See Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. Secretary of Human Servs., 511
N.E.2d 603, 607 (Mass. 1987) (state statute interpreted as directing Dept. of Public Wel-
fare "to provide aid sufficient to permit AFDC recipients to live in homes of their own").
For subsequent developments in this litigation, see Massachusetts Coalition for the
Homeless v. Secretary of Health & Hum. Servs., 661 N.E.2d 1276, 1284 (Mass. 1996).
31. See Jiggetts v. Grinker, 553 N.E.2d 570, 571 (N.Y. 1990), rev'g 543 N.Y.S.2d 414
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (state AFDC statute "imposes a statutory duty on the State Com-
missioner of Social Services to establish [housing] allowances that bear a reasonable re-
lation to the cost of housing."). See also Boehm v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that state general assistance statutes require objective de-
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In the child welfare context, some courts ordered foster care
agencies to assist families in obtaining housing when the lack of
adequate shelter was a primary factor preventing a family from
staying together or being reunited. 2 In 1986, a New York court
found that children in foster care must receive, prior to their re-
lease from the foster care system, training in independent living
skills, including apartment hunting, budgeting, shopping and
cooking.
Similarly, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corpora-
tion and the City of New York were ordered to comply with a
state statute by preparing and implementing, for persons being
released from mental hospitals, plans that included assurances
that adequate housing would be available.3
At the federal level, legal advocates (most prominently the
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty) have chal-
lenged federal agency action and inaction on homelessness legis-
lation, including implementation of the modest statutory re-
quirements of the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act.35
"[W]hile the crisis of homelessness has deepened over the
past decade, policy responses have become increasingly puni-
tive."3 6 More recently, litigation on behalf of homeless clients has
become reactive. Lawyers are increasingly finding it necessary
termination of housing costs).
32. See, eg., In re Nicole G., 577 A.2d 248, 249 (R.I. 1990); Hansen v. Department of
Soc. Servs, 238 Cal. Rptr. 232, 241-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Martin A. v. Gross, 524
N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987); In re P. et al., No. 12823 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1988).
33. Palmer v. Cuomo, 503 N.Y.S.2d 20, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
34. Heard v. Cuomo, 567 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1991), affid, 594 N.Y.S.2d 675 (N.Y.
1993).
35. Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (codified at 42 US.C. § 11301 (1997)). Persis-
tent litigation was necessary, for example, to force federal agencies to take seriously the
surplus property provisions of the Act, which required that unused federal real property
be turned over to homeless service providers. See generally National Law Center on
Homelessness and Poverty v. Veterans Admin., 819 F Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1993); National
Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty v. Veterans Admin., 765 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1991); Lee v. Pierce, 698 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1988); National Coalition for the Homeless
v. Veterans Admin., 695 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1988). For litigation to compel enforce-
ment of the McKinney Act's education provisions, see, e.g., National Coalition for the
Homeless v. Department of Educ., Civ. No. 87-3512 (D.D.C. 1988) (settlement); Lampkin
v. District of Columbia, 27 F.3d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reversing grant of motion to dis-
miss); Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 879 F. Supp. 116 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding statutory
violation and ordering injunctive relief); Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 886 F. Supp.
56 (D.D.C. 1995) (vacating injunction because the District of Columbia had withdrawn
from the McKinney Act program which provided financial assistance and imposed the
requirements the plaintiffs sought to enforce).
36. Lois M. Takahashi, A Decade of Understanding Homelessness in the USA From
Characterization to Representation, 20 PROGRESS IN HumAN GEoGRAIHY 291, 291 (1996).
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to devote their litigation efforts not to obtaining benefits for
homeless clients, but to combatting the "criminalization" of
homelessness. 37 With mixed success, they have been fighting
statutes, ordinances and policies that criminalize begging 8 and
living in public.3 9
I. SHIFTING IMAGERY: AN INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, there has been a shift in the way
court opinions reflect the image of homeless people and the as-
sumptions about the causes of their homelessness. The earliest
cases depicted the homeless as "derelicts"40 who had created
their own plight by, for example, becoming dependent on drugs
37. See generally Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its
Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Foscarinis, Downward
Spiral]; NATioNAL LAw CENTER ON HOmLESSNESS AND POvERTY, MEAN SwMs: A REPORT
ON ANTI-HoMELESS LAWS, LITIGATION AND ALTERNATIVES IN 50 UNITED STATES CrriEs
(1996); Harry Simon, Municipal Regulation of the Homeless in Public Spaces, in HomE-
LESSNESS IN AMERICA 149-59 (Jim Baumohl ed. 1996); Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling
Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zon-
ing, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996) [hereinafter Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct];
Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official
Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TULANE L. REV. 631 (1992);
Lorne Sossin, The Criminalization and Administration of the Homeless: Notes on the Pos-
sibilities and Limits of Bureaucratic Engagement, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 623
(1996).
38. See, eg., Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990); Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.
1993); Chad v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 861 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Benefit v.
City of Cambridge, 424 Mass. 918 (1997) (anti-begging statute violates First Amendment
of US. Constitution); Doucette v. City of Santa Monica, 955 F. Supp. 1192 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (ordinance regulating solicitation survives First Amendment challenge); Berkeley
Community Health Project v. City of Berkeley, 902 F. Supp. 1084, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(begging is expressive and is protected free speech under US. Constitution), injunctive
relief vacated, 966 F. Supp. 941 (1997).
39. See, eg., Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd,
97 F3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting facial challenge to ordinance prohibiting sitting or
lying on sidewalk in commercial areas during the day); see also City of Seattle v. Mc-
Conahy, 937 P.2d 1133 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting as-applied challenge to same or-
dinance); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992), appeal pending,
76 F.3d 1154 (Fla. 1996); Church v. City of Huntsville, No. CIV.A. 93-C-1239-5, 1993 WL
646401 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1993), vacated by 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994); Tobe v. City
of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995);
Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd on standing grounds,
61 F.3d 442 (5th Cia 1995); Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843
(N.D. Cal. 1994).
40. Callahan, supra note 2; Seeley v. State, 655 P.2d 803, 807-08 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982) ("inebriates and transients").
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and/or alcohol.41 They were also "helpless,"42 however, in that
their initial voluntary decisions had left them relatively incapa-
ble of changing their immediate situation, at least in the short-
term. This analysis supported the provision of emergency shel-
ter to protect these individuals from freezing to death on the
street.4
The "helpless" "derelicts" then began to be viewed as victims
of an "unfortunate plight,"4 of "recurring misfortunes,"45 or of
"economic hard times,"4 "not morally defective, but victims of an
often harsh economic system."47 Homeless people were portrayed
as responding to bad luck or to social and/or physiological forces
beyond their control.4 If some had initially contributed to caus-
ing their own problems, greater significance was assigned to the
involuntariness of their present condition, which they were inca-
pable of changing despite their best efforts.49 Public sympathy at
this stage was at its highest, leading to the enactment of social
programs and significant litigation victories.5"
Lawyers made conscious litigation decisions to emphasize
their view of the helplessness of their homeless clients. One of
the lead attorneys in a landmark lawsuit5' has written that, in
response to the City of Miami's treatment of the homeless as
41. See, eg., Callahan, supra note 2.
42. Callahan, supra note 2.
43. Callahan, supra note 2 ("[Elvery [New York] public official ... is vitally con-
cerned that no New Yorker (including the Bowery derelicts) freeze to death..."); Gary
Blasi, Litigation Concerning Homeless People, 4 ST. Louis U. PuB. L.F. 433, 435 (1985)
[hereinafter Blasi, Litigation Concerning Homeless People] ("[a] value widely shared...
is that people ought not freeze to death because they are poor, or crazy, or even because
they are alcoholics.").
44. Slade v. Koch, 514 N.Y.S.2d 847, 852 (Sup. Ct. 1987), modified, 517 N.Y.S.2d 389
(Sup. Ct. 1987).
45. Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245, 250 (W. Va. 1983) (quoting W. VA. CODE § 9-
1-1).
46. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992), appeal
pending, 76 E3d 1154 (Fla. 1996).
47. Thrower v. Perales, 523 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935 (App. Div. 1987).
48. See, eg., Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1563 (homelessness is the result of "various
economic, physical or psychological factors that are beyond the homeless individual's
control!).
49. See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 390 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd,
892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995) (citing testimony of homelessness expert Dr. Paul Koegel who
stated that "[s]tructural, personal and situational barriers prevent homeless persons
from securing housing" and explaining that the loss of housing makes it more difficult to
secure and retain new housing and to take advantage of necessary community services).
50. See Daniels, supra note 11, at 265 n.24 (1991) (noting public and political sup-
port for homeless causes throughout most of the 1980s).
51. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. 1551.
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"criminals worthy of brutal and inhumane treatment... [t]he
plaintiffs wanted the city to recognize homelessness as a social
and economic condition over which the homeless had little genu-
ine control."52 He urged lawyers to file similar lawsuits, in part
"to educate the community about homelessness in an attempt to
change public opinion.... Litigants must strive to give the
homeless a human face, showing them as people deserving of
rights and dignity as they struggle against circumstances often
beyond their control."53
But the lawsuits and the social programs did not succeed in
eliminating homelessness, although taxpayers believed very sub-
stantial amounts of their money were being spent to achieve
that goal. In fact, the problem seemed to be worsening, leading
many to wonder whether the source of the problem was within,
not outside, the control of homeless individuals themselves.54
Some even concluded that the programs were responsible for in-
creasing the numbers of homeless people.55
One result has been sharp reductions in funding for home-
lessness programs.56 Another has been heightened criminaliza-
tion of homelessness, and increasingly unsuccessful litigation
challenges to these initiatives. 57 Judges have become more in-
52. Benjamin S. Waxman, Fighting the Criminalization of Homelessness: Anatomy of
an Institutional Anti-Homeless Lawsuit, 23 STETSON L. REv. 467, 470 (1994). In a memo-
randum submitted to the court by the Pottinger plaintiffs, their lawyers asserted that
the plaintiffs:
are not homeless by choice, but by compulsion of poverty, due to unemploy-
ment, underemployment, and physical and mental disease. There is insufficient
free shelter for these thousands who are too poor or Mn to secure shelter for
themselves .... Therefore, the members of the Plaintiffs' class have no choice
but to live, and to engage in those acts necessary to maintain life, upon the
public streets, sidewalks, alleys, and parks within the city of Miami.
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant City of Miamis Motion to Dismiss or for Sum-
mary Judgment, at 1, Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. 1551.
53. Waxman, supra note 52, at 472.
54. See LIEBOW, supra noth 6, at 134 (reporting that a social worker, when asked by
a homeless woman how she would find a place to live when she didn't have a job, and
couldn't find a job because she didn't have a place to live, and would soon have to leave
a homeless shelter because it was closing, replied: "The answer, you'll find, is within
you!').
55. See, ag., Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case for An Unconditional Right to
Shelter, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoLY 17, 33 (1992) ("[O]pen-door shelter policies attracted
unexpected numbers of able-bodied entrants, and the shelters apparently fostered depen-
dency."); Robert C. Ellickson, The Homelessness Muddle, 99 PuB. INTEREST 45, 45 (Spring
1990) ("[I]ncreases in government shelter programs have increased the count of homeless
people.").
56. See, eg., supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing the situation in the
District of Columbia).
57. See, eg., Joyce, 846 F. Supp. 843; Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 0396, 1996
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clined to view homeless individuals as people who not only ini-
tially made bad decisions, but who voluntarily make ongoing
choices which the law need not respect.58 The images being re-
flected in these recent opinions thus convey impressions of
homeless litigants as people who have voluntarily chosen their
homelessness, making it easier for courts to rule against them.
A. Shifting Imagery: Cases in Point: "Derelicts"
In Callahan,59 widely credited as being the first court opin-
ion to establish a right to shelter for homeless people,60 a New
York trial court judge in 1979 found that the government social
service agency defendants had failed in their state constitutional
and statutory duty to "house all of the destitute and homeless
alcoholics, addicts, mentally impaired derelicts, flotsam and jet-
sam, and others during the winter months."61 The judge used
the word "derelicts" seven times to refer to the homeless plain-
tiffs in an opinion of fewer than 900 words. Finding that "every
[New York] public official ... is vitally concerned that no New
Yorker (including the Bowery derelicts) freeze to death . . .or
starve to death,"62 he ordered the defendants to submit a plan to
provide shelter space and food for an additional 750 of "the
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16041 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 1996); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d
1145 (Cal. 1995). But see Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 679 N.E.2d 184, 188 n.4 (Mass.
1997). In response to one of the state defendant's rationales for an anti-begging statute
as prevention of public "annoyance," the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court quoted
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1971): "[Plublic intolerance or animosity can-
not be the basis for abridgement of ... [C]onstitutional freedoms." Id. Cf Doucette v.
City of Santa Monica, 955 F. Supp. 1192 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding ordinance regulating
"abusive solicitation" narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interest in
preventing harassment and intimidation).
58. Love, No. 96 C 0396, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16041.
59. See Callahan, supra note 2.
60. See supra note 14, and sources cited therein.
61. Callahan, supra note 2. The legal authority for the decision consisted exclu-
sively of a footnote that simply cited a state constitutional provision, a state statute, a
city administrative code provision, and a court decision. The constitutional provision
was: 'The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided
by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as
the legislature may from time to time determine." N.Y. CONST. art XVII, § 1. The statute
was: "(E]ach public welfare district shall be responsible for the assistance and care of
any person who resides in or is found in its territory and who is in need of public assis-
tance and care which he is unable to provide for himself" N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 62(1)
(1992). The court's decision had held that the obligation of each public welfare district to
provide assistance and care under the statute was mandatory and not conditioned on re-
imbursement from the State. In re Jones v. Berman, 332 N.E.2d 303, 309-10 (N.Y. 1975).
62. Callahan, supra note 2.
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helpless and hopeless men of the Bowery ...."63
The judge's image of the homeless plaintiffs in Callahan
was influenced in part by the testimony of social services public
officials, such as the Commissioner of the State Department of
Social Services, who had stated that the group to which the
plaintiffs belonged was "largely composed of individuals with
histories of alcohol abuse, drug abuse, mental disorder or combi-
nations thereof. These conditions are chronic and seriously pre-
clude or prevent independent functioning.""
A 1980 federal court opinion provides another example of
the image of homeless people as deviants with immediate needs
requiring a government response. In a suit challenging a propo-
sal to close a Washington, D.C. homeless shelter, Judge Flan-
nery found it "difficult to imagine a situation involving more
egregious irreparable injury."65 The court held that "the issue of
homeless persons is so sensitive, the needs of these people are
so great, and their potential deprivation so basic, that the harm
to the [City] defendants is greatly outweighed ... .66
The imagery the judge used to describe the consequences of
closing the shelter, however, is revealing: "'he public would be
better served by having homeless persons housed at night
rather than flushing these people onto the city streets and forc-
ing them to find shelter and food that is beyond their means to
obtain."67 The public interest was seen in terms of public safety:
"[M]any of these people are emotionally unstable... [since] to a
great extent the problem of homelessness was caused by a lack
of support services for those persons released from [the city's
mental hospital]." 68 Other homeless individuals "may resort to
63. Id. The litigation was settled two years later, by means of a consent judgment
in which the City agreed to provide shelter and board to each homeless man who ap-
plied for it provided that "(a) the man meets the need standard to qualify for the home
relief program...; or (b) the man by reason of physical, mental or social dysfunction is
in need of temporary shelter." Callahan v. Carey, No. 42582179, Final Judgment by Con-
sent (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Aug. 26, 1981), reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE HOMELESS 329, 331
(PLI Litigation & Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series No. 428, 1992) (em-
phasis added).
64. Callahan, supra 2.
65. Williams v. Barry, 490 F Supp. 941, 943 (D.D.C. 1980).
66. Id. at 944.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. There is a long-standing debate in the literature about the degree of connec-
tion between homelessness and the deinstitutionalization of mental hospital patients. Al-
though this is an important question, relevant to the issues dealt with in this Article, it
is beyond the scope of the analysis attempted here to address it fully.
For a recent scholarly article that reviews this debate, rejects "the commonly held
view that deinstitutionalization is responsible for homelessness," and considers a "myth"
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the theory that "problems suffered and caused by the mentally ill homeless have re-
sulted from American psychiatrists' abandonment" of former patients, see Douglas Moss-
man, Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and the Myth of Psychiatric Abandonment: A
Structural Anthropology Perspective, 44 Soc. SCL MED. 71, 71 (1997). Mossman finds that
this myth "helps Americans deal more comfortably with the implications of homeless-
ness, lessens the challenge to cultural assumptions that mental illness represents, and
justifies a view of individuals as inherently rational whose virtues are always threatened
by government and society." Id. See also Stephen J. Schnably, Rights of Access and the
Right to Exclude: The Case of Homelessness, in PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE
21ST CENTURY 553, 556 n.8 (G.E. van Maanen &. A.J. van der Walt eds., 1996) (noting
the deinstitutionalization/homelessness debate and citing sources on both sides).
For an in-depth argument that deinstitutionalized persons became homeless because
of the lack of community-based social support networks available to them upon their re-
lease from hospitals, see MICHAEL J. DEAR & JENNIFER R. WOLCH, LANDSCAPES OF DESPAIR:
FROM DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION To HoNILEssNEss (1987). See also Arlene Kanter, Home-
less Mentally Ill People: No Longer Out of Sight and Out of Mind, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. Hum.
RTS. ANN. 331 (1986) (discussing community resistance to the creation of residences for
the mentally ill and the lack of funding for housing and other services); Michael L. Per-
lin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization,
28 Hous. L. REv. 63 (1991) (arguing that the link between deinstitutionalization and cur-
rent widespread homelessness is mythical, and questioning the efficacy of reliance on
courts to ameliorate the problems of homelessness); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Lib-
erty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375
(1982) (asserting that sufficient community facilities for deinstitutionalized individuals
were not created in part because of the short-sighted optimism of advocates who failed
adequately to estimate the extent of society's negative attitudes toward mentally ill peo-
ple, the amount of treatment such people would continue to need, and their ability to
survive on their own).
Perhaps the most comprehensive and sustained assertion of the connection between
deinstitutionalization, psychiatric abandonment and homelessness is E. FULLER TORREY,
NOWHERE To Go: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (1988). Torrey's
solutions include increased medication and reinstitutionalization. For a debate between
Torrey and a civil rights lawyer over the desirability of forced medication of homeless,
mentally ill individuals, see E. Fuller Torrey, Forced Medication is Part of the Cure, THE
NEW PHYsIcIAN 34 (Dec. 1986) (for), and Susan Stefan, The Psychiatric Cure for Home-
lessness: Wrong Diagnosis, Wrong Treatment, THE NEW PHYSIcIAN 37 (Dec. 1986)
(against).
Articles that focus on legal aspects of this issue include Arlene S. Kanter, Homeless
but Not Helpless: Legal Issues in the Care of Homeless People with Mental Illness, J. Soc.
ISSUEs, 1989, No. 3, at 91 (refuting as a proposed solution to the problem of the home-
less mentally ill more liberal involuntary commitment to mental institutions or outpa-
tient commitment in which courts require unhospitalized patients to receive treatment);
Jonathan P. Bach, Note, Requiring Due Care in the Process of Patient Deinstitutionaliza-
tion: Toward a Common Law Approach to Mental Health Care Reform, 98 YALE L.J. 1153
(1989) (arguing that the common law of torts can be used to deter the discharge of men-
tally ill patients to the streets where the hospital makes no attempt to provide commu-
nity support); Hedy M. Silver, Voluntary Admission to New York City Hospitals: The
Rights of the Mentally Ill Homeless, 19 COLum. L. REv. 399 (1988) (concluding that New
York hospitals have a legal obligation to admit and treat homeless people who volunta-
rily seek admission and who need psychiatric care).
For abstracts of additional sources on this issue, see Beth D. Jarrett & Wes Daniels,
Law and the Homeless: An Annotated Bibliography, 85 LAW. LIB. J. 463, 513-18 (1993).
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crime to satisfy their food, drink, and shelter needs .... Others
will simply wander the streets at night. Still others will wind up
in jail."69
B. Recurring Misfortune
Two years after the Callahan consent decree, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals held, in Hodge v. Ginsberg,70
that the Commissioner of the State Department of Welfare was
required to provide emergency shelter, food and medical care7'
to the homeless residents of the state, a group the court charac-
terized as "lack[ing] the means to maintain a permanent resi-
dence, and who therefore are often forced to spend their days
and nights on public streets, alleys, riverbanks, and other vari-
ous outdoor locations."72
The plaintiffs were granted this relief because their lawyers
convinced the court that homeless individuals were intended
beneficiaries of a state adult protective services statute. The act
required that services be provided to "incapacitated adults," de-
fined as persons "who by reason of physical, mental or other in-
firmity [are] unable to independently carry on the daily activi-
ties of life necessary to sustaining life and reasonable health."73
Using dictionary definitions of "infirmity" as "an unsound
unhealthy or debilitated state" and "a defect of personality or
weakness of the will,"7 the court concluded that the statutory
term "incapacitated adult" was "intended by the Legislature to
encompass indigent persons like the petitioners, who, by reason
of the recurring misfortunes of life, are unable to independently
carry on the daily activities of life necessary to sustaining life
and reasonable health."75
Two years after Hodge, the wave of sympathy for the home-
less that began to be felt in the 1980s76 was strikingly exempli-
fied by the opinion in Robbins v. Reagan.77 This case dealt with
an attempt by a homeless organization, the Community for Cre-
ative Non-Violence, to require the federal government to keep
open and renovate a building that had been made available to
69. Williams, 490 F. Supp. at 944.
70. 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983).
71. Id. at 251.
72. Id. at 247.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 249 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1970)).
75. Hodge, 303 S.E.2d at 250.
76. See Daniels, supra note 11.
77. 616 F. Supp. 1259 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 780 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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the group for use as a homeless shelter. Referring to the home-
less plaintiffs three times as the "truly needy,"78 Judge Charles
R. Richey found the homelessness situation "truly an
emergency."9
While authorizing the government defendants to begin
transferring the shelter residents to other facilities, the court
conditioned this authorization on the government's "devising ap-
propriate interim and long range plans to eliminate homeless-
ness in the Nation's Capital, and to provide humane solutions
for these needy and in all too many instances helpless human
beings."80 The judge warned that he would be "watching and
waiting to see what the President of the United States and his
associates in the government, as well as the leaders of the pri-
vate sector, do,"81 and he instructed that "no less than the Presi-
dent of the United States should treat this as a national emer-
gency, and call upon the captains of industry, health care
professionals, members of the medical and psychiatric profes-
sions, and others skilled in job training and counseling in order
that the full impact of the nation's resources can be brought to
bear to eliminate this national disgrace."82
C. Economic Hard Times
The prevailing view seems to have shifted by the mid-1980s
and early 1990s from one of personal dereliction and misfortune
to an image of large-scale helplessness in the face of impersonal,
structural forces.83
A number of courts concluded that the route to homeless-
ness is a path on which people travel involuntarily, and, conse-
quently, found homeless litigants entitled to legal protections
78. Id. at 1263, 1277, 1279 (quoting President Ronald Reagan).
79. Id. at 1279.
80. Id. at 1280 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 1263.
82. Id. at 1279.
83. Not all court opinions of this era, however, reflected such a benign view. The im-
age of dereliction and danger associated with homeless individuals had not completely
disappeared. See, eg., Spring-Gar Community Civic Ass'n v. Homes for the Homeless,
516 N.Y.S.2d 399 (Sup. Ct. 1987). While constrained by applicable law to find against
plaintiffs seeking to prevent a Holiday Inn in their neighborhood from being used to
shelter homeless families, the New York trial court described the shelter provider's ef-
forts as "trust[ing]," "depositing," and "dumping" homeless people into the community.
Id. at 400. The judge took pains to "recognize[ I the valid concerns and fears of the com-
munity that the establishment of this facility may bring serious ecological, sociological
and economic problems affecting the quality of life for the [neighboring] residents...."
Id. at 405.
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unavailable to those who freely chose their condition. In this
era, litigants, seen as involuntarily homeless because of eco-
nomic forces beyond their control, won court victories in such ar-
eas as voting rights, eligibility for emergency or safety net pub-
lic benefits and the "right" to live in public free of punitive
treatment by the police.
A federal judge in 1984 invalidated New York City's refusal
to register to vote homeless persons who did not reside in home-
less shelters.8 4 The decision relied heavily on the views of an-
thropologist Kim Hopper. The court summarized Hopper's
testimony:
[F]ifteen years [previously] it would have been relatively simple to define
the homeless population because they were a rather homogeneous group
of white males in the mid- to late fifties, a third of whom had severe
drinking problems .... In the late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of
the destruction of cheap housing stock due to urban renewal projects, the
character of the homeless population changed. By the mid-1970s, in New
York City, the homeless were primarily black males who were jobless
and by the end of the decade, forty percent of those seeking public shel-
ter stated the lack of a job as the primary reason for their
impoverishment."
An additional reason offered by Hopper for the increase in
the homeless population in the 1970s, the court reported, was
"the policy of 'deinstitutionalization' of those with mental disa-
bilities from the psychiatric institutions."86
The court went on to quote directly Hopper's views on the
causes of homelessness at that time: "Usually some dislocating
event occurred, [such as] loss of a job.., the precipitating event
84. Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Other successful homeless voting
rights cases of this era include: Committee for Dignity and Fairness for the Homeless v.
Tartaglione, No. 84-3447, 1984 US. Dist. LEXIS 23612 (E.D. Pa., Sept. 14, 1984) (Phila-
delphia); Collier v. Menzel, 221 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Ct. App. 1985) (Santa Barbara County);
Walters v. Weed, 231 Cal. Rptr. 615 (Ct. App. 1986) (Santa Cruz), review granted & opin-
ion superseded by 732 P.2d 1072 (1987), revd by 752 P.2d 443 (1988); and Board of Elec-
tion Comm'rs v. Chicago/Gray Area Union of the Homeless, No. Misc. 86-24 (Cook Co.
Ci. Ct. 1986) (Chicago). See also You Don't Need a Home to Vote, National Coalition for
the Homeless' Voting Rights Campaign, Nov. 4, 1997, <http://www.nch.ari.net/cases/
html> (summarizing selected federal and state cases on homeless voting rights) (on file
with author and the Buffalo Law Review). For an analysis of the homeless voting rights
cases in the context of the "economic utility" and "personality" theories of property
rights, see David L. Rosendorf, Comment, Homelessness and the Uses of Theory: An
Analysis of Economic and Personality Theories of Property in the Context of Voting Rights
and Squatting Rights, 45 U. MwI L. Rsv. 701, 717-22 (1990-1991).
85. Pitts, 608 F. Supp. at 699.
86. Id. at 699 n.11. See supra note 68, and sources cited therein (reviewing litera-
ture on this point).
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leading to homelessness is eviction, formal or informal in most
of the cases."8 7
The administrative difficulties of registering people without
readily-ascertainable residential locations were not deemed suf-
ficient to outweigh the plaintiffs' constitutional interest in par-
ticipating in the electoral process where their lack of a fixed,
traditional residence was a result of economic forces beyond
their control.
Some courts differentiated among groups of homeless peo-
ple, implying some were more worthy than others because their
condition had been caused by economic forces beyond their con-
trol rather than by personal failings. Dealing with a challenge to
time limits imposed on emergency assistance, the New Jersey
Supreme Court characterized the plaintiffs as
not the familiar single urban dwellers who seek shelter in bus or train
stations when the street is inhospitable [but as] drawn from that larger
group of relatively intact families in cities and suburbs who receive some
public assistance but not enough both to sustain decent housing and
meet their other basic needs.8
Although the court referred to one individual plaintiff as a
woman who "may have herself to blame for many of her
problems in that she was drug- and alcohol-dependent,"8 9 the de-
cision cites a law review article for the proposition that "home-
lessness functions not as a freely chosen option but as a tragic,
inexorable destiny"90 and quotes a report of the Commissioner of
Human Resources as asserting that the "structural problem of
too little affordable housing . . gives rise to most
homelessness."91
While the court apparently believed homeless people could
be categorized according to the morality of their conduct, the
court nevertheless concluded that "[a]ll persons, regardless of
fault, are entitled to the basic human needs for shelter and food
and it is the obligation of government to ensure that these
needs are metf 92
87. Pitts, 608 R Supp. at 699-700.
88. Franklin v. New Jersey Dep't. of Human Servs., 543 A.2d 1, 2 (N.J. 1988).
89. Id. at 3.
90. Id. at 3 (quoting John C. Connell, A Right to Emergency Shelter for the Homeless
Under the New Jersey Constitution, 18 RuTGERS LJ. 765, 769 (1987)).
91. Id. (quoting a report to the state legislature by the Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Human Services, Mar. 10, 1988).
92. Id. at 10 (citing a report of the Governor's Task Force on the Homeless).
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In a case concerning a related issue, the New Jersey Ap-
peals Court referred to homeless individuals as "those who can-
not help themselves"93 and who "cannot compete for safe, sani-
tary, and decent shelter."94 The court held arbitrary and
unreasonable a regulation disqualifying individuals for emer-
gency housing assistance if they had an "opportunity to plan"
defined exclusively in terms of notice. The court found that
many recipients would have "no meaningful opportunity to plan
in advance "because the notice period would be insufficient to
enable them to locate alternative housing considering the eco-
nomic means of the family and the availability of affordable al-
ternative housing[.]"95
Invalidating a county's practice of terminating general relief
benefits for recipients who could not produce a valid address
within sixty days, a California appellate court explained that
"[t]o the extent a purpose of the challenged regulations may be
to encourage general relief recipients to obtain housing, the re-
cord does not show as a matter of law the possibility of finding
such housing is reasonably realistic as opposed to merely theo-
retical."96 The court cited as "[flactors contributing to increased
homelessness in 6 alifornia... shortages of housing affordable
to low-income persons and the release of patients from state
hospital beds in the move to deinstitutionalize the mentally
fll.- 97
In the early 1990s, a federal judge in Miami concluded that
police treatment of homeless individuals in that city had failed
to meet constitutional standards. The court held that:
* [T]he City's practice of arresting homeless individuals for hahmless, in-
voluntary conduct which they must perform in public is cruel and unu-
sual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
* [Sluch arrests violate plaintiffs' due process rights because they reach
innocent and inoffensive conduct.
93. Maticka v. City of Atlantic City, 524 A.2d 416, 423 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1987) (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 425. See also Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless, 661 N.E.2d 1276
(reversing and remanding summary judgment upholding regulation terminating emer-
gency assistance benefits to families who reject three opportunities for "safe, permanent
housing," in the absence of fixed standards of housing affordability).
96. Nelson v. San Diego County Bd. of Supervisors, 235 Cal. Rptr. 305, 310 (Ct. App.
1987).
97. Id. at 310 n.4 (citing a study published by the California Department of Housing
and Community Development). Regarding the asserted connection between deinstitution-
alization and homelessness, see supra note 68.
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* [T]he City's failure to follow its own written procedure for handling
personal property when seizing or destroying the property of homeless
individuals violates plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights.
* [T]he City's practice of arresting homeless individuals for performing
essential, life-sustaining acts in public when they have absolutely no
place to go effectively infringes on their fundamental right to travel in
violation of the equal protection clause.98
Finding that "arresting homeless people for innocent, invol-
untary acts" was "clearly not the answer to homelessness,"9
Judge C. Clyde Atkins portrayed homelessness as the result of
"various economic, physical or psychological factors that are be-
yond the homeless individual's control."0 0 Refuting the City's ar-
gument that the plaintiffs' homelessness was not involuntary in
the same sense as that of the recent victims of Hurricane An-
drew, the judge asserted that "[a]n individual who loses his
home as a result of economic hard times or physical or mental
illness exercises no more control over these events than he
would over a natural disaster."10 1
In reaching his conclusions, the judge relied heavily on the
views of a sociologist known for his work on homelessness, Pro-
fessor James Wright, who had testified (echoing the comments
of Kim Hopper in Pitts)102 that "homeless individuals rarely, if
ever, choose to be homeless. Generally, people become homeless
as the result of a financial crisis or because of a mental or phys-
ical illness."10 3 "The lack of reasonable alternatives," Atkins
paraphrased Wright, "should not be mistaken for choice."10 4
The court's characterization of the plaintiffs as involuntarily
homeless was a predicate for its favorable rulings on each of the
constitutional counts. This is most explicitly true with respect to
the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim. 0 5
98. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1992), appeal
pending, 76 F.3d 1154 (Fla. 1996).
99. Id at 1583.
100. Id. at 1563. The judge thus adopted the plaintiffs' lawyers' assertions regarding
their clients' lack of choice. See Waxman, supra note 52.
101. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1564 (emphasis added).
102. Pitts, 608 F. Supp. 696. See also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
103. See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1557.
104. Id. at 1565.
105. For recent law review commentary on the application of the Eighth Amend-
ment to homeless individuals, see Juliette Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in
Public: A Paradigm for Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 CoLur,. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
293, 295 (1996) (arguing that 'the Robinson doctrine should apply to prohibit arrests of
the homeless for public sleeping in cities with inadequate shelter space."); Edward J.
Walters, Comment, No Way Out: Eighth Amendment Protection for Do-or-Die Acts of the
Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. RXv. 1619 (1995) (arguing that "punishing homelessness is cruel
706 [Vol. 45
RECURRING MISFORTUNE
Judge Atkins invoked Robinson v. California, the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1962 opinion that held unconstitutional a statute
criminalizing the status of being addicted to the use of narcotics
and that distinguished punishment for an involuntary status
from punishment for voluntary acts. 1 6 The court then cited
lower court opinions that had invalidated vagrancy laws, based
on Robinson, as punishing status or condition. 107 Atkins stressed
that "voluntariness of the status or condition is the decisive
factor."'108
Turning to Powell v. Texas, in which the US. Supreme
Court, applying Robinson, upheld the application of a statute
making public drunkenness a crime, Atkins focused on the con-
curring opinion of Justice White, whose vote was necessary to
the Coiirt's judgment. 0 9 White concurred only because he was
not convinced that the defendant's alcoholism compelled him to
drink in public. White argued, however, that it would be uncon-
stitutional to apply the statute to "unfortunate[ ]" alcoholics for
whom "the public streets may become home . . . because they
have no place else to go . . . [and ,for whom] avoiding public
places while intoxicated is ... impossible."" 0
Citing social science evidence that "homelessness is due to
various economic, physical or psychological factors that are be-
yond the homeless individual's control[,]""' and finding that
"[t]he harmless conduct for which [the plaintiffs] are arrested is
inseparable from their involuntary condition of being homeless,"
the Pottinger court concluded that "arresting the homeless for
harmless, involuntary, life-sustaining acts such as sleeping, sit-
ting or eating[,] acts they are forced to perform in public effec-
tively punishes them for being homeless" and is cruel and unu-
sual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment." 2
because homeless people are unable to change their position and often unable to comply
with the law," that "because of a lack of public shelter, eating facilities, or bathrooms,
the [homeless] would die if they did not violate the law," id. at 1631, and proposing that
"courts must invalidate statutes that offer people no lawful choice but death," id. at
1620). See also Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 37.
106. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1562 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962)).
107. Id. (citing Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58, 64 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated
on other grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971) and Headley v. Selkowitz, 171 So. 2d 368 (Fla.
1965).
108. Id,
109. Id. at 1562-63 (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968)).
110. Id. (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 551) (White, J., concurring)).
111. Id. at 1563.
112. Id. at 1564. As relief, the court ordered the City to establish two "arrest-free
zones" where the City would be enjoined from arresting "homeless people who have no
1997]
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Similarly, a Texas federal district court held in 1994 that
"as long as homeless persons must live in public, their sleeping
may not be constitutionally criminalized."" 3 The court found
that "for a number of Dallas homeless at this time homelessness
is involuntary and irremediable[,]" and that "[b]ecause being
does not exist without sleeping, criminalizing the latter necessa-
rily punishes the homeless for their status as homeless, a status
forcing them to be in public."114 Consequently, the challenged or-
dinance prohibiting sleeping in public, when applied against
homeless individuals, violated the Eighth Amendment under
Robinson's interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment."'
The order of the Johnson district court enjoining enforce-
ment of the sleeping ordinance was reversed and vacated, the
Fifth Circuit holding that plaintiffs lacked Eighth Amendment
standing because they had not been convicted of violating the
ordinance. 116 The Court of Appeals opinion, however, did not
reach the district court's substantive conclusion on the status
issue.
D. Lifestyle Choices
Although lawyers were able to win some significant litiga-
tion victories by portraying their homeless clients as unfortu-
nate victims of forces beyond their control, this approach had
significant risks, and carried the seeds of its own destruction.
The risks of the helplessness strategy are illustrated by re-
cent cases which reflect shifting images of homeless plaintiffs,
leading to litigation defeats.117
alternative shelter" for "harmless conduct such as sleeping or eating." Id. at 1584.
113. Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 351 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd on
standing grounds, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995).
114. Id. at 350.
115. Id. The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment argument
that enforcement against the homeless of other ordinances, such as those prohibiting
"the removal of waste from receptacles, coercive solicitation, or trespassing," unconstitu-
tionally punished as status rather than conduct acts the plaintiffs had asserted were "a
necessary correlative of homelessness... ! Id. at 349-50.
116. Johnson, 61 F.3d at 445.
117. One explanation for the move from litigation victories to losses may have to do
with the shift in litigation context from civil law to criminal law. Criminal liability is
heavily oriented toward personal responsibility, and individuals are presumed to be re-
sponsible for their illegal behavior. It may, therefore, be more difficult to convince courts
of the involuntariness of conduct associated with homelessness in the criminal area. On
the other hand, while public benefits statutes facially have based eligibility on the exis-
tence of present need and not on the causes of need, established categories of eligibility
have depended quite heavily on th perceived distinctions between the "worthy" and the
"unworthy" poor. See, eg., Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strat-
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The transition from sympathy to skepticism is illustrated by
the decisions in Church v. City of Huntsville issued by the fed-
eral district and appellate courts, 18 and in Tobe v. City of Santa
Ana by the California Court of Appeals and the California Su-
preme Court." 9
In Church, an Alabama federal district court found that the
city of Huntsville had implemented a policy of "isolating and/or
removing" its homeless citizens and regularly "harassing, intimi-
dating, detaining or arresting [them] solely because of their sta-
tus as homeless persons, for walking, talking, sleeping, or gath-
ering in parks and other public places... .120 Among the city's
actions were "wholesale removal of homeless people from their
places of abode under the state highway bridges," taking and
failing to return most of the personal property of homeless peo-
ple caught in this sweep, police taking homeless individuals be-
yond the city limits and abandoning them there, and a City
Councilman's statement that "those homeless . . . should be
'show[n] ... the city limits."'-s1
Without citing any specific constitutional provision or case
precedent, the court held that the city had a constitutional duty
not to discriminate against the homeless and preliminarily en-
joined the city from implementing its policy of isolation, re-
moval, harassment, intimidation, detention and arrest of the
homeless plaintiffs. 22
The Eleventh Circuit, however, vacated the injunction on
the merits of the constitutional issue. While finding that the
plaintiffs had standing, the court was
unable to agree that [removal of the homeless and their property from
under highway bridges was] indicative of a City policy to violate the
rights of the homeless. The Constitution does not confer the right to tres-
pass on public lands. Nor is there any constitutional right to store one's
personal belongings on public lands.m
egy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697, 1703-09 (1993); Joel Handler,
'Constructing the Political Spectacle": The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization,
and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK L. REv. 899, 927-31 (1990).
118. No. CIV.ANo. 93-C-1239-S, 1993 WL 646401, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1993),
vacated and remanded, 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994).
119. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 892
P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995).
120. Church, 30 F.3d at 1342 (emphasis in original).
121. Church, 1993 WL 646401, at *2.
122. Id. at *1.
123. Church, 30 F.3d at 1345.
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With respect to the claims of official harassment, the court
concluded that much of this consisted of the police arresting
homeless persons for public intoxication when they were admit-
tedly intoxicated. 124 Citing Powell but not once mentioning
Robinson or Pottinger, the court held that "[tihe Constitution
does not exempt the homeless from the laws against public in-
toxication....'25 The other claims of harassment were found to
be too isolated and too stale, even if they otherwise would have
amounted to constitutional violations. 26
In Tobe, homeless individuals challenged the constitutional-
ity of an ordinance prohibiting camping in public under which
they had been arrested. The City of Santa Ana had enforced the
ordinance by conducting what the Court of Appeal termed a
"harassment sweep" of the homeless, who were "handcuffed,
transported to an athletic field for booking, chained to benches;
marked with numbers, and held for as long as six hours before
being released at another location, some for crimes such as
dropping a match, a leaf, or a piece of paper or jaywalking."' 27
The City's policy was "that the vagrants are no longer welcome
in the City of Santa Ana'2 8 Its objective was to "clean[] up its
neighborhoods and forc[e] out the vagrant populationf"'2 9
The intermediate appellate court's opinion relied heavily on
expert testimony from homelessness expert Dr. Paul Koegel, 130
who had stated that:
Structural, personal and situational barriers prevent homeless persons
from securing housing. [Tihe high cost of housing, lack of affordable
housing, competition for what low-cost housing does exist, absence of fed-
erally subsidized housing and an insufficient number of shelter beds
make it extremely difficult for homeless persons to find housing and es-
124. Id. at 1345 n.7.
125. Id. at 1345-46. The court quoted from Justice White's concurring opinion in
Powell: "A [public intoxication) statute ... is constitutional insofar as it authorizes a po-
lice officer to arrest any seriously intoxicated person when he is encountered in a public
place." Id. at 1346 n.8 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 554 n.5 (1968) (White, J.,
concurring in the result)). However, the court ignores Justice White's reference to
homelessness.
126. Id.
127. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 892
P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995).
128. Id. at 387 (quoting municipal memoranda from City's Executive Director of
Recreation and Community Services to Park Superintendent).
129. Id. at 388 (quoting memo to Santa Ana Deputy Manager from City's Executive
Director of Recreation and Community Services).
130. Koegel was "co-director of a large study of homelessness and an expert from
the Rand Corporation," Id., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390.
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cape homelessness. '
In addition to Koegel's testimony, the court considered the
declarations of ten homeless individuals living in the Civic
Center who were targets of the challenged ordinance. As de-
scribed by the judge, they included:
* a 58-year old [man] who became homeless when the truck he used for
hauling jobs was stolen.... [He] is looking for work.n 2
* [a] 35-year-old [woman] who is schizophrenic and from a suicidal fam-
ily. [After being cited under the ordinance she said:] 'I didn't have any-
where to go.7m
* [a 45-year-old-man who] lost his job a year ago ....
* [a 32-year-old woman who] has been homeless since her mother forced
her to leave home.m
* [a man who] generally works as a gardener or in construction, but who
becomes homeless when he is out of a job.' 6
"[H]ow can [these] petitioners," asked the court, "satisfy the
essential human need for sleep under the camping ordi-
nance? . . . [U]nder this ordinance, . . . petitioners will ulti-
mately be leaving Santa Ana or living in jail [because] [m]ost
will have no other alternative."13 7
The City had argued that the homeless petitioners had
failed to prove that they were involuntarily homeless. The court
dismissed this claim as a "frivolous lawyer's gambit we thought
Anatole France had long since put to rest [with his famous ref-
erence to the] 'majestic egalitarianism of the law [which] forbids
rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges . . . . "13
Citing Pottinger, the Court of Appeals held that application
to the homeless of the anti-camping ordinance violated the
Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment provi-
sion.' 39 Applying Robinson, the court found that "[hlomelessness,
like illness and addiction, is a status not subject to the reach of
the criminal law; and that is true even if it involves conduct of
an involuntary or necessary nature, e.g., sleeping."140 Court of
Appeal Justice Crosby recalled the question posed by U.S. Su-
131. Id. at 390.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 391.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 392.
138. Id. at 393 n.10 (quoting ANATOLE FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE ch. 7 (1984)).
139. Id. at 393.
140. Id.
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preme Court Justice William 0. Douglas in a law review article:
"'How can we hold our heads high and still confuse with crime
the need for welfare or the need for work?'"141
The court's bottom line was:
The city... may not preclude people who have no place to go from sim-
ply living in Santa Ana.... To view homeless people in our midst is
deeply disturbing in a country of such vast wealth.... The attack must
be on the cause, not the victims; for they in the main are no more con-
tent with their circumstances than a1yone else is.142
But the California Supreme Court reversed, holding the or-
dinance valid on its face and finding that only a facial challenge
had been perfected.14 The court said it was unable to "conclude
that the city intends to enforce the ordinance against persons
who have no alternative to 'camping' or placing 'camp parapher-
nalia' on public property."144 The justices cited as support the
comments made at oral argument by a senior deputy district at-
torney to the effect that "a necessity defense might be available
to 'truly homeless' persons [and that] prosecutorial discretion
would be exercised."14
In endorsing the implication that many persons subject to
the ordinance would not "have no alternative" 146 or be "truly
homeless,"147 the court implicitly rejected the notion underlying
court opinions finding most homelessness a result of forces be-
yond the control of homeless individuals.'48
141. Id. at 394 (quoting William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70
YALE W. 1, 12 (1960), cited in Parker v. Municipal Judge of City of Las Vegas, 427 P.2d
642, 644 (Nev. 1967)).
142. Id. at 395 n.15.
143. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Cal. 1995).
144. Id. at 1155 n.8.
145. Id. Justice Mosk, in dissent, reasoned that the question of voluntariness was
complex and ultimately irrelevant, given the lack of presently-available services for
homeless individuals.
We need not inquire into the "voluntariness7 of all the acts or decisions that
might have led [the homeless petitioners] to their current plight. As many of
the briefs and expert submissions point out, the questions whether the home-
less ... are "voluntarily" living in the streets is complex. Even when services
or welfare benefits are available, it may be beyond the resources of many
[mentally ill and substance-addicted] homeless persons to avail themselves of
such assistance. In any event, in light of the ,shortage of services and beds for
the homeless ... the question of "voluntariness7 is almost academic.
Id. at 1173 n.8.
146. Id. at 1155 n.8.
147. Id.
148. See also Dowell v. Comm'r of Transitional Assistance, 677 N.E.2d 213, 214 n.2
& 215 (Mass. 1997) (rejecting facial challenge to regulation rendering ineligible for emer-
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The ideas that much homelessness is "voluntary," and that
homeless individuals should therefore look to themselves rather
than to the courts for resolution of their problems, have also re-
cently been adopted by federal judges ruling on a status crime
challenge to law enforcement efforts directed toward people liv-
ing in public 49 and on a Fourth Amendment challenge to the de-
struction of homeless individuals' property.150
In Joyce, homeless plaintiffs challenged San Francisco's Ma-
trix Program, which aggressively enforced certain "quality of
life" ordinances' 5' against persons living in public, and thus al-
legedly unconstitutionally penalized homeless persons for engag-
ing in life-sustaining activities. Denying a preliminary injunc-
tion, the federal district court noted with apparent approval the
City's contention that many of the targeted homeless individuals
had refused social services offered as part of the City's
program.1 52
The court further seemed receptive to the City's argument
that each of the plaintiffs was not "actually homeless." 153 This
conclusion was reached because the plaintiffs included people
who, according to the City, had:
* declined to live with a daughter because she could not afford to shelter
him
* found housing unsatisfactory that had been offered by a housing clinic
* claimed none of his acquaintances was a suitable roommate
* refused to sleep at a drop-in shelter because of fear of the inhabitants
* been suspended from public assistance payments for missing
appointments
* currently had housing and had been "on the streets for at most a few
nights."154
gency assistance benefits families who had "rendered [themselves] homeless ... due to
an eviction from public and/or subsidized housing for nonpayment of rent" although the
regulation may result in denial of benefits to families who were not at fault for their
homelessness).
149. Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
150. Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 0396, 1996 US. Dist. LEXIS 16041 at *5"
(N.D. ll. Oct. 23, 1996).
151. An intra-departmental police memorandum explaining the program directed
vigorous enforcement of ordinances prohibiting trespassing, public inebriation, urinating
or defecating in public, removal or possession of shopping carts, solicitation on or near a
highway, erection of tents or structures in parks, obstruction and aggressive panhan-
dling, in an effort to address a "type of behavior [which] tends to make San Francisco a
less desirable place in which to live, work or visit." Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 846.
152. Id. at 847.
153. Id. at 849.
154. Id. at 849-50.
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Explicitly disagreeing with Pottinger's application of Robin-
son, Judge Jensen held for preliminary injunction purposes that
it was unlikely plaintiffs would be successful in arguing that
homelessness is a status and that acts derivative of such a sta-
tus are protected from criminal sanction.1 5 Jensen characterized
as "sheer speculation" the conclusion that the outcome in Powell
would have been different if the defendant had been homeless,
calling Justice White's statements in concurrence "dicta," and
questioning whether White would have voted differently in Pow-
ell had the defendant been homeless."5
"As an analytical matter," Jensen wrote, "homelessness is
not readily classified as a 'status[,]'" as compared to "age, race,
gender, national origin and illness[,]" characteristics he associ-
ated with "involuntariness of the acquisition (including the pres-
ence or not of that characteristic at birth)," citing Robinson,
"and the degree to which an individual has control over that
characteristic .... [T]he ability to eliminate one's drug addic-
tion as compared to one's homelessness is a distinction in kind
as much as in degree."157
In a subsequent opinion certifying a class in the same case,
the judge further noted the City's argument that the decision of
one of the plaintiffs "not to spend the money he has [$300 a
month in charitable contributions] on housing compromises his
'involuntariness' claim . . .15
In Love, a federal district court rejected, for preliminary in-
junction purposes, a constitutional challenge to the City of Chi-
cago's practice of seizing or destroying property belonging to
homeless people living in public. Faced with a Fourth Amend-
ment claim by homeless plaintiffs whose property had been
seized or destroyed by city employees during "cleanings" of the
areas in which they were living, Judge Wayne R. Anderson
made a factual finding that "[m]ost of the homeless individuals
involved in this lawsuit, at least those who are not mentally ill,
appear to be choosing homelessness." 59 This assertion was based
155. Id. at 856. The court referred to the Tobe Court of Appeal's conclusion that
homelessness is a status as based on "an abbreviated policy analysis" with 'citations to
Robinson and Powell [that] were no more than ornamental." Id. at 856, n.7. The opinion
also notes that the Church district court's similar conclusion of unconstitutionality
neither "cites to a single case or engages in any analysis . . . " Id. at 856 n.8.
156. Id. at 857. Jensen noted that White had dissented in Robinson.
157. Id.
158. Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 30 Fed. R. Ser. 3d 907, 1994 WL
443464, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1994).
159. Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 0396, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16041 at *7
(N.D. IM. Oct. 23, 1996).
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in part on testimony regarding the city's efforts to obtain shelter
for the plaintiffs, 160 and despite testimony from plaintiffs' expert
witness, University of Chicago Social Services Professor Michael
Sosin, regarding "the causes of homelessness and the voluntari-
ness of the decision to live on the streets."16'
The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the City did
not
have an obligation to ensure the safety of property that people volunta-
rily leave on the City's property, or on... private property ... The City
is not an insurer for the property of people who choose to live on City
property rent-free, nor is the public required to accommodate totally the
life-style choices made by homeless individuals .... The choice of the
homeless to live in the [area from which their belongings were being
taken] includes the assumption of the risk that their property may be
lost.... If a person has something valuable... and chooses not to carry
it on his person, the chance will always exist that it will disappear or be
taken because life is not risk-free.162
III. Is HOMELESSNESS "VOLUNTARY?"
Yes, life is a continuous and endless series of choices for
everyone. Homeless individuals do make decisions about their
lives, and it is fruitless and perhaps harmful to assert other-
wise. Advocates should consider abandoning the argument that
the behavior of homeless people is "involuntary," and instead fo-
cus on the scope and the nature of the alternatives available to
those individuals. Advocates may conclude that the aim of their
legal and/or political efforts should be to expand the scope and
improve the nature of those alternatives.
As the cases discussed above demonstrate, success or failure
in litigation on behalf of homeless individuals has depended
heavily on convincing courts of the "involuntariness" of the liti-
gants' present condition. Lawsuits are won when judges find
homeless people "helpless" 6 3 and subject to forces "beyond their
control."164 Recent cases are being lost because judges are con-
vinced that homelessness is a "lifestyle choice."165
160. Id. at *5-7.
161. The court's opinion merely mentions that Sosin testified on these issues, with-
out characterizing the content of his testimony. Id. at *4.
162. Id. at *14-16.
163. Callahan, supra note 2.
164. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992), appeal
pending, 76 F.3d 1154 (Fla. 1996)
165. Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 0396, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16041 at *5
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Judges seem to think, and lawyers seem to believe they
have to convince judges that homelessness is either "voluntary"
or "involuntary."16 This is a false dichotomy. For most homeless
people, there are significant elements of both agency and com-
pulsion in the decisions they make. It may be that for many,
homelessness is at some level "voluntary." But the range of
choices available to homeless individuals may be so narrow and
so unsatisfying that a condition many of us cannot imagine be-
ing freely chosen is indeed the least of all possible evils.
"Far from the socially disorganized, disaffiliated, and dis-
empowered misfits that they are often made out to be . . .
[homeless people] make rational if unorthodox choices based on
the circumstances of their lives ... "167
When a homeless person is found on the street rather than
in a dangerous homeless shelter,168 "abandonment quality" hous-
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 1996).; see generally Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F.
Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
166. Great Britain has created a statutory distinction between voluntary and invol-
untary homelessness. Section 191 of the Housing Act of 1996 states:
(1) A person becomes homeless intentionally if he deliberately does or fails to
do anything in consequence of which he ceases to occupy accommodation which
is available for his occupation and which it would have been reasonable for
him to continue to occupy ....
(3) A person shall be treated as becoming homeless intentionally if-
(a) he enters into an arrangement under which he is required to cease to oc-
cupy accommodation which it would have been reasonable for him to continue
to occupy, and
(b) the purpose of the arrangement is to enable him to become entitled to as-
sistance under this Part, and there is no other good reason why he is homeless.
(4) A person who is given advice or assistance under section 197 (duty where
other suitable alternative accommodation available), but fails to secure suitable
accommodation in circumstances which it was reasonably to be expected that
he would do so, shall, if he makes a further application under this Part, be
treated as having become homeless intentionally.
The 1996 Act expanded the definition of intentional homelessness that had existed
in a prior version, § 60 of the Housing Act 1985. See General Note to § 191, 21 HA-
BURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES: CURRENT STATUTES SERVICE 317 (4th ed., 1997).
The Housing Act 1996 generally weakened the statutory right to permanent housing
for homeless individuals in Great Britain. Ellen Malos & Gill Hague, Women, Housing,
Homelessness and Domestic Viwlence, 20 WOmEN's STUD. INV'L F. 397, 398 (1997).
For a discussion of the difficulties this "intentional homelessness" provision has
caused for courts and administrative agencies that have tried to interpret it, see IAN
LOVELAND, HOUSING HOMELESS PERSONS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 193-221 (1995). See also PETER ROBSON & MARK POusTE, HOMELESS PEOPLE AND
THE LAw 151-235 (3d ed. 1996).
167. Robert Desjarlais, Some Causes and Cultures of Homelessness, 98 AM. ANTHRO.
POLOGIST 420, 421 (1996) (reviewing DAVID WAGONER, CHECKERBOARD SQUARE: CULTURE
AND RESISTANCE IN A HOmELESs COMMUNITY (1993)).
168. See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1580:
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ing169 or a psychiatric hospital,170 that person's present condition
may reflect affirmative decision-making. 171 That person's situa-
tion might not meet the test of "voluntariness" applied in court
decisions.
But what does it mean to say that the person has "volunta-
rily" made a "choice?"
A. Social Science
What does social science research tell us about the extent to
which homelessness is "voluntary?" Does it support a theory of
homelessness as the exercise of personal agency in a world of
very limited, destructive and debilitating alternatives?
Most research on homelessness, one social scientist has as-
serted, has "consisted of... surveyesque, funding-driven re-
search reports .... "172 Studies that focus on "the distribution of
characteristics and personal deficits among homeless people"
have predominated over those that analyze the "structural and
macroeconomic phenomena that have produced so many very
poor people."173 Different approaches, however, are beginning to
appear in the literature.
One recent work by three sociologists uses "an 'extended
case method' approach to the macrolevel causes of homelessness
[E]ven where there is available space in a shelter, it may not be a viable alter-
native, 'if, as is likely, the shelter is dangerous, drug infested, crime-ridden, or
especially unsanitary... Giving one the option of sleeping in a space where
one's health and possessions are seriously endangered provides no more choice
than does the option of arrest and prosecution.
Id. at n.34 (quoting Paul Ades, The Constitutionality of %ntihomeless" Laws: Ordinances
Prohibiting Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77
CAL L. REv. 595, 620 n.183 (1989)).
169. See John M. Quigley, The Homeless, 34 J. EcoN. LrTERATuRE 1935 (1996) (re-
viewing BRENDAN OTLAHERTY, MAKiNG Room THE EcONOMCS OF HOmELESSNESS (1996)).
Quigley writes: "The richest, rational, utility maximizing, homeless person is just indif-
ferent between 'abandonment quality' housing at its market-determined rent and home-
lessness at zero rent." Id. at 1937.
170. See Michael O's Story, in CRY OF THE INvIsiBLE: WRITNGS FROM THE HOMELESS
AND SuRvivoRs OF PsycmAIc HOsPrrALs 25 (Michael A. Susko ed. 1991) ("The streets
are better than the [psychiatric] hospital.... You don't have needles shot into you. If
you run into a tangle on the streets you can move away from it. Here, you can't.").
171. See also ROB ROSENTHAL, HoMELEss iN PARADISE: A MAP OF THE TERRAIN 64
(1994) (reporting the comment of a homeless woman who had been dropped from the SSI
disability benefit program during the Reagan administration's draconian eligibility re-
view: "I tried prostitution .... I never in the world would have thought of doing any-
thing like that under normal circumstances. But, I mean, what else could I do? Welfare's
not there for me any more.").
172. Desjarlais, supra note 167, at 420.
173. Blasi, And We Are Not Seen, supra note 9, at 579.
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in order to combine a 'structural approach to homelessness' with
an ethnographic attentiveness to 'the concrete experience' of be-
ing homeless."174 The authors assert that "homelessness is not a
result of 'faulty people'-those suffering mental illness or alco-
holism or from broken homes-or of 'faulty values' ... .-171
Rather, the causes are structural,
rangting] from a growing shortage of affordable housing in urban set-
tings to a decline in jobs that keep many families and individuals above
the poverty line . . .. [Ploverty ...is the crux of the matter ....
[S]tructural conditions lead to poverty, which, when tinged with bad
luck, causes homelessness, which in turn prompts other problems, like
mental instability and drinking.176
Anthropologist I. Susser situates homelessness within a
phenomenon of "increasing inequality and poverty generated
within the global economy of advanced capitalism."177 Susser
sees "[h]omeless populations [as] one of the few highly visible
and public signs of the increasing poverty of millions of Ameri-
cans. They have emerged as a symbol of the new
poverty . ...
Still, there remain
a significant number of social scientists who believe that individual vul-
nerabilities or deficits constitute the primary cause [of homelessness].
Researchers argue, for example, that mental instability, substance abuse,
criminal history, spousal abuse, family instability, veteran status and
other personal vulnerabilities lead to, or substantially intensify, home-
less episodes. 179
174. Desjarlais, supra note 167, at 420 (quoting DOUG TIMMER ET AL., PATHS TO
HOmLESSNESS: EXTrEME PovERTY AND THE URBAN HOUSING CRISIS (1994)).
175. Id.
176. Desjarlais, supra note 167, at 420-21. See also Takahashi, supra note 36, at
293 ("[S]tructural trends have exacerbated individual vulnerability to becoming home-
less, resulting in a growing population at risk."). •
177. L Susser, The Construction of Poverty and Homelessness in U.S. Cities, 25 ANN.
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 411, 411 (1996).
178. Id. at 412.
179. Takahashi, supra note 36, at 295 (citing Lillian Gelberg et al., Mental Health,
Alcohol and Drug Use, and Criminal History Among Homeless Adults, 145 A. J. PsYcHi-
ATRY. 191 (1988); S. Martin Taylor et al., The Housing Experience of Chronically Men-
tally Disabled Clients in Hamilton, Ontario, 33 CAN. GEOGRAPHER 58 (1988); David Wood
et al., Homeless and Housed Families in Los Angeles: a Study Comparing Demographic,
Economic, and Family Function Characteristics, 80 AJi. J. PUB. HEA TH 1049 (1990); Rob-
ert E. Drake et al., Homelessness and Dual Diagnosis, 46 A. PSYCHOLOGIST 1149 (1991);
Marjorie J. Robertson, Homeless Women with Children, 46 A. PSYCHOLOGIST 1198
(1991); Ezra S. Susser et al., Childhood Antecedents to Homelessness in Psychiatric Pa-
tients, 148 Ams. J. PSYCHIATRY 1026 (1991); B.C. Wietzman et al., Predictors of Shelter Use
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In fact, "[s]ome put this argument even more strongly, indicat-
ing that the homeless person her or himself, because of alcohol,
drugs and mental illness, constitutes the root cause of
homelessness."180
Sociologists Anne B. Shlay and Peter H. Rossi reviewed, as
of the early 1990s, "contemporary social science research on
homelessness."18l With respect to the causes of homelessness,
the authors characterized the existing state of research as sug-
gesting a "convergence of many factors ... including housing
market dynamics, housing and welfare policy, economic restruc-
turing and the labor market, and personal disabilities."18 2 They
noted the debate in the literature about whether research
should focus on "structural forces that permit homelessness to
occur or the immediate reasons why people become homeless."8 3
The debate that has taken place in courts over the "volunta-
riness" of homelessness tracks this social science literature, even
though judges relatively rarely explicitly cite to that literature
in their opinions. The views expressed in judicial opinions im-
plicitly reflect judges' understanding of the state of social sci-
ence learning regarding homelessness. This understanding is in-
formed to a great extent by briefs and testimony made available
to courts by lawyers.'8 It rests on the false dichotomy that as-
Among Low-Income Families: Psychiatric History, Substance Abuse, and Victimization,
82 Am J. PuB. HEALTH 1547 (1992); C.L.M. Caton et al., Risk Factors for Homelessness
Among Schizophrenic Men: A Case Control Study, 84 Am J. PuB. HEALTH 265 (1994); and
Diane Hartz et al., Correlates of Homelessness Among Substance Abuse Patients at a VA
Medical Center, 45 Hosp. & COMm. PsYcmATRY 491 (1994)).
180. Id. (citing ALICE S. BAUM & DONALD W. BuRNEs, A NATION IN DENiAL: THE
TRuT ABOUT HoHELESSNESS (1993)). But see Quigley, supra note 169, at 1938 (increased
availability of crack cocaine is not a significant factor in the increased incidence of
homelessness, and may even have been "an ameliorating factor" because its low cost
compared to other drugs would free more income for housing).
181. Anne B. Shlay & Peter H. Rossi, Social Science Research and Contemporary
Studies on Homelessness, 15 ANN. REv. Soc. 129, 129 (1992). Shlay and Rossi comprehen-
sively surveyed the social science literature, including some sixty local and national data
collection studies conducted from 1981 to 1988. Id. at 134. The authors concluded that
there was great diversity among the homeless. There were, however, characteristics
shared by most or many homeless individuals. These included youth; single marital sta-
tus; severe chronic problems including mental illness, alcoholism, physical disabilities,
and poor health; criminal history; history of foster care; and long-term unemployment.
"All suffer from economic deprivation." Id. at 129-30.
182. Id. at 130.
183. Id.
184. See, eg., the assertions regarding homeless persons' lack of choice-made by the
Pottinger lawyers in Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant City of Miami's Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D.
Fla. 1992), appeal pending, 76 F.3d 1154 (Fla. 1996) (No. 88-2406), and the correspond-
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sumes homelessness is either "voluntary" or "involuntary."
B. Public Opinion
Researchers have concluded that contemporary public opin-
ion closely parallels the prevailing view among scholars that
"the causes of homelessness are complex and include both struc-
tural and individual factors."18 5
There is "a strong tendency for the public to link homeless-
ness to deviant status."1 6 A majority (53.5%) of people surveyed
in 1990 agreed with at least one of the following statements:
homeless people are "more dangerous than other people," are
"more likely to commit violent crimes than other people," or
"should be kept from congregating in public places in the inter-
est of public safety."18 7 More than one-third (37.1%) thought
"homelessness frees a person from worries that other people
ing conclusion adopted by the judge in that case. Although an in-depth study of the
briefs and testimony presented to courts in cases involving homeless litigants is beyond
the scope of this Article, such a study would be valuable. Among the many questions it
could inform are: what are the bases on which judges form their sociological conclusions
regarding homelessness; who are the most influential scholars; what are the most influ-
ential schools of thought; and how do shifts in assumptions about the nature and causes
of homelessness in the social science community translate conceptually and temporally
into lawyers' arguments and judicial opinions?
185. Bruce G. Link et al., Public Attitudes and Beliefs about Homeless People, in
HOmELESSNmS IN AMERICA 143, 146 (Jim Baumohl ed. 1996) (report of a survey con-
ducted in 1990). See also Paul A. Toro & Dennis M. McDonell, Beliefs, Attitudes, and
Knowledge About Homelessness: A Survey of the General Public, 20 AM. J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOL. 53 (1992) (report of a survey conducted in 1989-1990); Barrett A. Lee et al.,
Images of the Homeless: Public Views and Media Messages, 2 HousING PoL'Y DEBATE 649
(1991) (reporting data from four telephone surveys conducted 1987-1990 and from a re-
view of media coverage of homelessness 1980-1990).
186. Link, supra note 185, at 144. The authors use the term "deviant status" to in-
dude addiction to drugs or alcohol (the average respondent believed 54.5% of homeless
people fit this description), having been in jail or prison (45.1%), and being mentally ill
(31.5%). The researchers found that 90.8% of their survey respondents thought drug and
alcohol abuse contributed to homelessness. Id. at 144-45. 72.1% identified "irresponsible
behavior" of the homeless themselves as a contributing factor. Id. at 146. A 1995 Gallup
Organization nationwide survey for the Los Angeles Mission reported public opinion rat-
ing alcoholism almost equally with lack of affordable housing as major causes of home-
lessness. THE GALLuP ORGANIzATIoN, HOMELESS BUT NOT HOPELESS (1995). In 1992, a Gal-
lup/Los Angeles Mission survey of the homeless in Los Angeles reported that the
homeless themselves believe the major causes of their homelessness were: "(1) Alcohol or
drugs; (2) Lost or can't find a job; (3) Economy; (4) Can't afford housing." Education is
Not Necessarily a Ticket Out of Poverty, Reports New Gallup /Los Angeles Mission Home-
less Opinion Survey, Los ANGELES MISSION NEws (Los Angeles Mission, Los Angeles, CA)
Dec. 15, 1992, at 3.
187. Link, supra note 185, at 145.
RECURRING MISFORTUNE
have about jobs and families."188
Large percentages of opinion poll respondents have favored
"criminalization" solutions, including involuntary hospitalization-
of mentally ill homeless people (favored by 86.6%),189 and
prohibitions on panhandling (69.9%),190 setting up temporary
shelter in public parks (69.1%)191 and sleeping overnight in pub-
lic places (50.8%).192
At the same time, a very high percentage of the public also
believes that important causes of homelessness include struc-
tural factors related to housing (81.7%), 193 the economic system
(79.1%), 194 and a lack of government aid (73.8%).195 The vast ma-
jority have "feelings of sadness and compassion for homeless
people (85.8%) and say they feel angry that so many are home-
less in a country as rich as the United States."196
There is also very widespread support for federal govern-
ment action in a number of areas: free drug and alcohol treat-
ment (83.1%), additional public housing (78.9%), tax breaks for
private developers of housing for poor people (76.1%), rent subsi-
dies for homeless people (73.3%), a higher minimum wage
(69.7%) and even, in a climate of "welfare reform," increased
welfare benefits for homeless people (54.4%).197
Social scientist Lois Takahashi has argued that "[t]he sup-
port often found in public opinion polls for increased public
spending to alleviate homelessness can be traced in part to the
growing acceptance that homelessness is not caused solely by
the personal deficits of individuals, but is the result of multiple
factors, largely structural in naturef 98 She cites "[r]ecent attitu-
dinal studies in the [United States that] have indicated that
there is a wider acknowledgement among the populace that
homelessness derives in large part from structural and institu-
tional changes which homeless individuals could not control." 99
188. Id. at 146.
189. Id. at 147.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 146.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 146-47.
198. Takahashi, supra note 36, at 293 (citing Barrett A. Lee et al., Are the Homeless
to Blame? A Test of Two Theories, 33 Soc. Q. 535 (1992) [hereinafter Lee et al., Are the
Homeless to Blame?]).
199. Takahashi, supra note 36, at 301 (citing Lee et al., Are the Homeless to Blame?,
supra note 198, and Toro & McDonnell, supra note 185).
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Nevertheless, according to Takahashi, "there remains the
perception that many homeless persons are to some degree per-
sonally responsible for their becoming homeless or, more impor-
tantly, for their remaining homeless."2 10 This attitude has led
many to act to prevent programs targeted to homeless individu-
als from being established in their communities, and to disman-
tle those that already exist.201
Takahashi believes that this attitude in turn is attributable
in large measure to the ways in which homeless people are rep-
resented to the public: a "highly stigmatized understanding of
homeless persons ... [who] continue[] to be associated with lazi-
ness, alcoholism, drug abuse, mental disability, criminalism and
even perversion."20 2 She suggests, then, that the public backlash
against homeless individuals and programs associated with
them be "understood as the outcome of structural processes
which serve to stigmatize and marginalize specific groups" 2 3
She finds research lacking in a number of important aspects
of representation, including "militancy/homeless empower-
ment,"20 4 defined as organized political action undertaken by
homeless individuals themselves. 205 She attributes the lack of re-
search in this area in part to "the portrayal of homeless persons
as 'victims' to elicit public sympathy" and to promote public
funding for programs intended to benefit them, which advocates
fear might be threatened by images of organized militancy.20 6
200. Takahashi, supra note 36, at 301.
201. Id. at 297.
202. Id. at 299 (citing Mary Lou Gallagher, Homeless-Not Hopeless, 60 PLANNING
18 (1994)).
203. Takahashi, supra note 36, at 299. See also Stephen Lofiredo, Poverty, Democ-
racy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. Rav. 1277, 1285 (1993) ("[L]egislative failure
to engage in reasoned deliberation [regarding poor people] has produced a politics
marked by scapegoating, stereotyping, and stigmatization."); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric
of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1503 (1991) ("[T]he
cultural separation and stigmatization of the poor has been a feature of most Western
cultures throughout modern history... [Tihe poor... have been cast as different, devi-
ant, and morally weak.).
204. Takahashi, supra note 36, at 303.
205. Id. at 304.
206. Id. at 304-05. See Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 679 N.E.2d 184, 189 (Mass.
1997) (anti-begging statute is "viewpoint based," and thus a First Amendment violation,
"because it favors the view that poor people should be helped by organized [charitable]
groups and should not be making public requests for their necessities."). See also Me-
lanie B. Abbott, Seeking Shelter Under a Deconstructed Roof- Homelessness and Critical
Lawyering, 64 TENN. L. Rav. 269, 310 (1997) (asserting that empowerment of the home-
less "assumes a level of readiness that many homeless people may not be able to
achieve[; since they are] attempting merely to survive... [they are] unlikely to be ready
for relatively sophisticated group process."). But see Virginia Shubert & Mary Ellen
[Vol. 45
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Thus, the substantial reservoir of sympathy apparently felt
for homeless people in some respects by the public is under-
mined by an image of personal fault, of "voluntariness." This
stigmatized image persists for the homeless, as it does for other
marginalized groups, as a function of their political powerless-
ness. 20 7 The faults of those whose voices are not heard are more
politically costly.
Homeless advocates (including legal advocates), having
identified a tragically oppressed group of people, without an ef-
fective voice in the political process, 208 have sought to relieve
their suffering by portraying them as helpless victims. But the
creation and perpetuation of that image, however well-inten-
tioned, has contributed to a perpetuation of the problem. It has
at best evoked charity or benign neglect. Active hostility, if not
in the forefront, is always at least in the near background.
Real solutions, based on economic justice, call for a very dif-
ferent kind of advocacy. As Gary Blasi suggests, advocates
should be arguing for "rights to a job[,] .. the economic means
to survive... [and] decent affordable housing" rather than "the
right to sleep in the park and to beg in the subway... [and] for
the placement in neighborhoods of mass shelters that no one
(including homeless people) reasonably wants to live in or
near."
209
C. Listening to Homeless People
Why do homeless people think they are homeless? Pub-
lished sources reveal a wide variety of views.210 Steven Vander-
Staay, who spent six years interviewing "hundreds" of homeless
people, notes that "most cite a combination of personal and so-
cial factors" to explain their situation.211 He concludes that "the
homelessness described in [his oral history] is at once simple
Hombs, Housing Works: Housing Opportunities for Homeless Persons, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE
Rnv. 740, 749 (1995) (arguing that ' t]he marginalization of homeless persons has meant
that 'successful advocacy has required militancy that borders on belligerence!'" (quoting
HOUSING WORKS, INC., 1994 STRATEGIC PLAN 6 (1994))).
207. See also Rosendorf, supra note 84, at 702 (noting that "individual rights are
implicitly defined by property ownership principles.!).
208. "Courts have always been used by those who find the balance of political forces
against them.... The use of the courts often appears to be a less dangerous and less
costly means than nonlegal struggles against formidable opponents." JOEL F. HANDLER,
SOCIAL MovEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SySIEM 22 (1978).
209. Blasi, And We Are Not Seen, supra note 9, at 569.
210. In addition to the sources cited in this Part, see also PHILIP MICHAEL BULmAN,
CAUGHT IN THE Mix: AN ORAL PORTRAIT OF HOMELESSNESS (1993).
211. VANDERSTAAY, supra note 1, at viii-x.
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and complex: simple by virtue of the economic shifts and inequi-
ties which emerge as the root causes of the crisis, and complex
because of the great diversity of personal situations these forces
impact."212 The common denominator in the tales told by home-
less people is poverty. "Each [story] is set into motion by a dis-
tinct event, but each reaches the street for the same reason:
lack of money or other resources of assistance."213
VanderStaay writes:
Understanding the balance of personal and societal factors that create
homelessness . . . is a delicate act of framing specific stories within
larger social and economic contexts.... [A]chiev[ing] this balance... oc-
curs each time we sit across from someone, open our minds, and listen.214
If we listen carefully, we might hear textured and layered
stories portraying strength, resourcefulness and courage in a
world of adversity many of us can at best only dimly imagine.
We might derive essential clues in the search for solutions to
the tragedy of homelessness.21 5
Some homeless people attribute their homelessness to per-
sonal failings:
212. Id. at ix.
213. Id. at 61.
214. Id.
215. Vanderstaay suggests what homeless people themselves believe are the
solutions:
Homeless people seek solutions that account for their own experience. Persons
homeless through loss of work see employment as their greatest need; others
stress a safe and affordable home as the foundation upon which they can base
other progress. Most recognize that effective drug and alcohol treatment must
accompany job assistance and housing programs for people who need it:
[They] cry for help beyond housing-for child care, medical attention, sub-
stance-abuse programs, and jobs .... [Mlany... freely admit personal diffi-
culties that complicate their situations .... But the idea that people should be
punished for behavior they already suffer under makes no sense to homeless
people .... They are nearly unanimous in wanting to substantially raise the
minimum wage, increase support for dependent families, veterans, and the dis-
abled, and in their desire for housing programs that integrate poor families
into middle-class neighborhoods. Most see universal health care as an essential
human right. They want schools that give a ghetto child a chance, streets that
permit safe passage, a war on drugs that cares for the wounded, and job assis-
tance programs that provide jobs, not assistance . . . . [T]he solutions that
homeless people suggest not only lack the political homogeneity common to
those who speak for them, they point to new ways of thinking about the prob-
lem ....
VANDERSTAAY, supra note 1, at 183-85.
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* [M]e being homeless is due to... me not being able to get along with
my family.216
* I wasn't able to achieve my high school diploma... because I wanted
to be with the in-crowd. 17
* I became homeless for being neglectful with my children and not hav-
ing any job skills or even my education .... [What had a big play in me
becoming homeless is self-sabotaging... it's a feeling disease that ...
the majority of the people in the world have ... low self-esteem, feelings
of low self-worth... just self-hate.... I started leaving my kids alone at
home and then I end up losing them.218
Others identify as the cause of their homelessness the un-
availability of familial and social support:
* Money is the only difference between someone with no home and who
is staying in a motel, or even renting a room at the Y, and someone liv-
ing on the street or in a shelter. In the same way, indeed, those people
who are without a home of their own, but who have a family they can
crash with, are spared the stigma of "homelessness:"2 9
* We on the street have long recognized that Social Services operates
under the policy of "Don't make it too easy for them." . . . A county
caseworker told me that before she could process my application I must
bring in receipts from all the people I'd panhandled from so she could to-
tal my monthly income. But my personal all-time favorite is 'Provide
proof of no income."20
* Elliot lives in a dream world. He thinks all those staff people and vol-
unteers were around to give love and help. I found some folks sincere in
216. Nelson Johnson, Homeless Voices Page, Oct. 2, 1997, <http'//nch.ari.net> (In-
ternet site maintained by the National Coalition for the Homeless) [hereinafter Homeless
Voices] (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
217. Carolyn Wade, Homeless Voices, supra note 216.
218. Penny Callan, Homeless Voices, supra note 216.
219. "Km" (a pseudonym) was one of two homeless women whose comments on the
author's text were interspersed in footnotes throughout the book Here she is comment-
ing on the author's references to three other homeless women, one who "defined her
problem as being familyless rather than homeless," another who "defined true homeless-
ness as having no family," and a third who "took the more conventional view that she
was homeless because she had no family to prevent her from sliding into it, or, being
there, to help her climb out of it!" (quoted in LIEBOW, supra note 6, at 84).
220. Id. at 142 n.* (Kim, commenting on the author's observation that social welfare
policy seems to be based on an assumption that making it "too easy" for the needy poor
encourages dependency). See also RosENTHAL, supra note 171, at 64. Rosenthal recalls
the comments of a homeless woman on her experiences with the California Department
of Social Services office in Santa Barbara:
There was one woman down there,... she really made you feel like a piece of
shit. I don't know whether they still have that same sort of policy of making
you feel so disgusted with it that you decide that you don't want to go through
their trip, so you drop off and that's one less person that they have to hassle
with.
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their efforts to help, others it seemed were there to be congratulated for
being a volunteer .... The way people in authority treated you some-
times, I thought they were just out to rob me of what little I had left of
my self esteem.2 1
In its extreme (but not unusual) form, there is not just a
lack of support from those counted on to provide it, but overt
abuse:
* I had to either try to live with [my husband] under the circum-
stances-which was unbearable-or try to make it on my own. I tried to
find a job and a place to stay, but I just couldn't do it in time. And then
I was robbed.... So I found myself without money or a place to live.
And I had to take [my two daughters] with me. I would have been fright-
ened to leave them with him at home.... [W]ith children you can't be-
gin to look for a job until you find child care. Then my credit is messed
up because of my husband.... I don't care to describe it, the things he
did to me... and I shudder to think what would have happened if there
wasn't a place [a battered women's shelter] to go.rn
* One thing that did strike me as I began to make friends with the
homeless women-all their backgrounds pointed to some form of abuse in
their lives as children.2
* There is little I can say here about homeless women as wives. I lived
an abused life as a married woman. I nearly lost my mind.m
There are those who attribute homelessness to structural
economic forces:
* [I]n Washington [D.C.] there are no... strong unions or regulations for
putting up . . . government buildings and as a result, we just make
enough to basically feed ourselves.... And most people are laying people
off instead of hiring, there's just no permanent jobs available .... So, we
go from one temporary situation to another, and never manage to get
enough money together.., to do anything... for ourselves in a perma-
nent way. So it's a kind of a self-perpetuating situation.22
221. LIEsow, supra note 6, at 160 n.* (Grace, commenting on the author's assertion
that "raiany [shelter] staff persons ... offered consolation, encouragement, advice when
asked, and a sympathetic ear.").
222. Marsha, an African-American woman in her thirties (quoted in VANDERSTAAY,
supra note 1, at 168-69).
223. Grace, in LIEBOW, supra note 6, at 102 n.* (commenting on the author's state-
ment that "some of the strongest feelings and worst relationships with parents were ex-
perienced by those younger women who traced their situations to being forced out of the
house by one or both.parents or who had chosen homelessness and shelter life over in-
tolerable conditions at home).
224. Id. at 107 (Grace, commenting on the author's statement that "[mi]any of the
homeless women had been married at one time or another, but most of them had noth-
ing to do with their former husbands.").
225. Mike, a "construction worker, unemployed at the moment," Homeless Voices,
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* It's a real tough job . . . to pay the high cost of rent--on minimum
wage, or a small pension .... [Niowadays with computerization and
automation, the whole strata of lower level jobs has been completely
eliminated.m
* I didn't mind personal questions. ... What I did mind was in the
course of their asking questions, they then tried to judge me and pro-
ceeded to tell me what I did wrong since I now found myself homeless.
There was this general consensus, that if you were homeless, you must
have caused it to happen. I had paid staff and volunteers tell me what I
needed to do, in their opinion, to get myself out of this situation. They
told me that I needed to save money! When you are working and making
next to nothing, there is no money to save.2
7
And there are those who perceive the confluence of forces
that can bring about an individual's homelessness. Listen to a
woman named Georgia, writing in an essay she called "Shelter
Life:"
What is life like with the confines of the overnight shelter or temporary
lodging place for those who have been displaced by society's rules or for
some other reason? Some may prefer to use the often-used phrase 'fallen
through the cracks. I would use the word 'displaced. Whatever word or
phrase that one wants to use .makes no sense unless one has been there.
... [T]o apply this 'falling though the cracks' to a whole generation of
people is almost unbelievable even to those who have lived this
nightmare .... Think about it. There would have to be a mighty force
behind any group of people to cause so many of them to fall through
these cracks. ... There were many reasons that people became displaced
in the decade of the early 1980s. Some of these were: absent husbands,
death of a spouse, loss of income, inability to work and baby-sit a small
child at the same time, sickness, disability due to illness, evictions be-
cause of unemployment, insufficient wages to cover all the necessary ex-
penses. So you starved or you froze. Terrible choices in this land of
plenty ... According to an article the press wrote when I was homeless,
homelessness was brought about by a group of people who were lazy,
drunkards, or mentally ill persons. They were folks who were looking for
handouts and for someone to take care of them. Basically, those state-
ments were bogus and unfounded in truth.
22
supra note 216.
226. Paul Dietrich, Homeless Voices, supra note 216.
227. Grace, in LIEBOW, supra note 6, at 137 n.* (commenting on the author's refer-
ence to homeless women's resentment at having to answer personal questions (about sex
and drugs, for example), over and over again, as "part of the price they paid for being
powerless" and in dire need of subsistence-level assistance).
228. DEBORAH PUGH & JEANIE TiETJEN, I HAvE ARRIVED BEFORE MY WORDS: AUTOBIO-
GRAPHICAL WRTINGs OF HoMELEss WoMEN 127-28 (1997).
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IV. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS
Litigation victories in the early right to shelter and benefits
cases were predicated on portrayals of homeless plaintiffs as
"helpless and hopeless. "229 Lawyers were able to win cases in ju-
risdictions where local law could be interpreted to impose af-
firmative obligations on government to care for the "worthy"
poor.2 0
The successful lawsuits provided invaluable (sometimes life-
saving) relief to some homeless individuals. 231 But the number of
jurisdictions in which such legal claims were available was al-
ways quite limited, 23 2 and even in those jurisdictions, judicial
limits are being imposed on the extent to which the claims will
be recognized.M3 Many of the benefits have become further com-
promised as a result of "welfare reform."23 4 In addition, where
the relief achieved was emergency shelter, it became increas-
ingly apparent that systems of mass, government-provided tem-
porary shelters and welfare hotels were not a long-term (or even
a very effective or humane short-term) solution to the problem
229. Callahan, supra note 2.
230. See generally James K. Langdon & Mark A. Kass, Homelessness in America:
Looking for the Right to Shelter, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 305 (1985); Chackes,
supra note 23.
231. [In many, if not most, of the communities in which there has been significant
public action to address the problem of homelessness, that action has been the product
of court orders." Blasi, Litigation Concerning Homeless People, supra note 43, at 434.
232. See, eg., Hilton v. City of New Haven, 661 A.2d 973, 974-75 (Conn. 1995) (re-
jecting homeless plaintiffs' claim that the city has a state constitutional obligation to
provide shelter).
233. See, eg., Mixon v. Grinker, 669 N.E.2d 819, 820 (1996) (reversing a lower court
judgment that would have required New York City to provide "minimally habitable"
housing to HIV-il homeless plaintiffs, by finding immune from judicial review a City
program which placed up to twelve HIV-ill homeless individuals in a dormitory environ-
ment with common eating and bathroom facilities).
234. Federal "welfare reform" legislation was enacted in 1996. The Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2105 (1996), eliminates the federal entitlement to welfare benefits, § 103(a), caps the
amount the federal government will spend for welfare benefits, id., and provides states
broad discretion in using federal block grants, id., while prohibiting states from provid-
ing benefits to many unmarried teenage parents, id., to recipients deemed ready for
work after twenty-four months, id., to all families after sixty months, id., and to most
immigrants, id. §§ 401-03, 411-12.
For articles that deal concretely with strategic issues for lawyers in the "welfare re-
form" environment, see, e.g., Rob Paral, State-Level Non-Citizen Welfare Policies: Issues
for Advocates, 31 CLFARNHOUSE REv. 146 (1997); Tanya Neiman, A Community-Based
Response to Welfare Reform, 31 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 165 (1997); Alan W. Houseman, Le-
gal Representation and Advocacy Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu-
nity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 932 (1997).
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of homelessness." 5
As taxpayers wearied of subsidizing programs that seemed
both expensive and ineffective, 36 and as local governments de-
vised law enforcement responses, legal advocates found them-
selves directing their energies to combatting the "criminaliza-
tion" of homelessness.
Even when criminalization lawsuits are successful, the
rights established are negative rights, in that at most they re-
strict ways in which government can punish homeless people for
engaging in certain types of behavior, such as begging or living
in public. The courts do not impose aff=iative federal constitu-
tional duties on government defendants to address the needs of
homeless individuals.2 37 And the state can remove the constitu-
tional barrier to official punitive measures, a barrier cognizable
only in a context of "involuntary" homelessness, by offering
homeless people even the most minimal of alternatives, such as
"beds" in emergency shelters, or even a "shelter's floor."2 8
To some extent, establishing negative rights through litiga-
tion has led some governments to initiate programs to deal with
homelessness, and this has been a purposeful strategy for law-
235. See Maria Foscarinis, Beyond Homelessness: Ethics, Advocacy and Strategy, 12
ST. Louis U. Pus. L. REv. 37, 42 (1993) [hereinafter Foscarinis, Beyond Homelessness]
(noting that "[tihe provision of emergency relief [to homeless individuals] ... has become
a permanent operation [and] [a]s emergency measures become entrenched, they become
part of the mechanism that may allow homeless people to survive but not to escape their
plight."). See generally KOZOL, supra note 6 (graphically portraying the horrors of life for
homeless families in New York City's welfare hotels).
236. See J. Phillip Thompson, The Failure of Liberal Homeless Policy in the Koch
and Dinkins Administration, 111 PoL. Sci. Q. 639, 658-59 (1996) ("[B]illions of taxpayers'
money [was spent] on homeless housing without slowing the rate of family
homelessness!).
237. See, e.g., Church v. City of Huntsville, No. CIV.A. 93-C-1239-5, 1993 WL
646401, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1993) ("[T]he City... is under no constitutional duty
to address the problem of its homeless citizens . .. "), vacated by 30 F3d 1332 (11th Cir.
1994); Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 350, 351 ("The Court does not suggest
that the City must provide the homeless with anything ... [A]s a matter of constitu-
tional jurisprudence the City is not required to provide shelter or housing to any-
one... !), rev'd in part, vacated in part by 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995); Pottinger v. City
of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1992), appeal pending, 76 F.3d 1154 (Fla.
1996) ("Obviously, the ideal solution would be to provide housing and services to the
homeless. However, [this] is a matter for the government . . .to address, not for the
court to decide.").
238. See, eg., Johnson, 860 F Supp at 350:
There are not enough beds available at the area shelters to accommodate the
demand.... For many... homeless.., the unavailability of shelter is not a
function of choice; it is not an issue of choosing to remain outdoors rather than
sleep on a shelter's floor because the shelter could not provide a bed that one
found suitable enough.
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yers filing "criminalization" lawsuits.2 9 It is politically unpopu-
lar to allow large numbers of homeless individuals to remain
publicly visible. Their obvious presence is believed to harm com-
merce and tourism.2 4° Too often, however, the response is that
programs are designed for the purpose of removing homeless
people from public view,241 not with the goal of eradicating the
root causes of severe poverty and homelessness.
Even where the intent is to ameliorate the suffering of
homeless people, rather than simply to hide them from custom-
ers and tourists, the helplessness image leads in the wrong di-
rection. When the cause of the helplessness is conceived as indi-
vidual weakness, rather than structural inequality, behavior
modification is constructed as the cure.242 This solution is pur-
sued through treatment for addiction and mental illness and
through "work incentives" accomplished by means of benefit re-
duction and elimination.
In some instances, courts have identified larger social and
economic forces, considered beyond the control of homeless indi-
viduals, as the cause of their homelessness. But the typical po-
239. See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 52. Waxman notes that "[i]f significant strides
are to be made in reducing homelessness, large scale [litigation] challenges to the anti-
homeless policies of governments and public sector agencies must be initiated." Id. at
469. He adds that "[if institutional anti-homeless policies are to be eliminated and re-
placed by thoughtful and effective programs to reduce homelessness consistent with con-
stitutional and statutory rights, more large scale lawsuits like Pottinger must be filed
and prosecuted. Id. at 496.
240. See, eg., Waxman, supra note 52, at 472 ("In Miami, the anti-homeless policy
[challenged in the Pottinger litigation] was fueled largely by the complaints of local
merchants that the unsightly and menacing presence of homeless persons was destroy-
ing their businesses."). See also City of Seattle v. McConahy, 937 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1997) (finding ordinance prohibiting sitting or lying on sidewalks in commercial
areas during the day a response to a "legitimate legislative health and safety concern" in
part because "shoppers were deterred from coming into [these] areas because petty crime
and blight were increasing."); Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp.
843. 846 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (describing city's Matrix Program, which aggressively enforced
a variety of ordinances against the homeless, as having been instituted following the is-
suance of a report by the Mayor's Office of Economic Planning and Development that
had "attributed to homelessness a $173 million drain on sales in the City.").
241. Schnably, supra note 68, at 557 (describing local governments' "invisibility"
strategy for dealing with homelessness). See also Susser, supra note 177, at 412 ("Politi-
cal concern for housing the homeless, or at least removing them from the streets and
subways, stems from the need to make the increasing inequality to which the majority of
the residents are subject invisible, individual, and private."); Ross, supra note 203, at
1503 ("[The poor] have been cast as different, deviant and morally weak. These assump-
tions make coherent the physical separation of the poor from the affluent.").
242. Schnably, supra note 68, at 558 (describing local governments' "disciplinary"
strategy for dealing with homelessness, which "[requires] the victims to blame them-
selves as a condition of offering them the help of experts").
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litical response to the rulings in those cases is inconsistent with
the courts' sociological conclusions. Emergency shelter, treat-
ment programs and "welfare reform" are not answers to struc-
tural economic problems.243 Yet, judges consider themselves
helpless to devise more effective solutions,2 and they are will-
ing to accept as legally sufficient seriously inadequate program-
matic responses. 24
Even seriously inadequate programmatic responses to
homelessness may provide some meaningful, if ultimately short-
term, relief to the immediate suffering of some homeless individ-
uals. If litigation can evoke a pain-mitigating response, criticism
of those efforts should proceed with caution.246
243. Desjarlais, supra note 167, at 421: "[Slhelters sustain, rather than alleviate, a
state of impoverishment and dependency (Reviewing TIMnmR ET AL, supra note 174).
See, eg., L.T. v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 624 A.2d 990, 993 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1993); Franklin v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 543 A-2d 56, 65 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); Spring-Gar Community Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Homes for the
Homeless, 516 N.Y.S.2d 399, 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). See also Shubert & Hombs, supra
note 206, at 750 (arguing that "most emergency services and many transitional housing
programs, infantilize [homeless] persons by denying them the permanence and stability
necessary to establish and maintain a stake in the community.").
244. See supra note 237 and cases cited therein; see also Ross, supra note 203, at
1499-1501 (analyzing US. Supreme Court opinions in constitutional cases involving poor
people and concluding that the opinions are replete with rhetoric that assumes eradicat-
ing poverty is probably impossible and would at least require radical social transforma-
tion well beyond the institutional competence of the judiciary to try to bring about).
245. Even federal Judge C. Clyde Atkins, whose opinion in Pottinger represents per-
haps the most sweeping example of judicial intervention on behalf of homeless people,
has indicated on remand a strong reluctance to evaluate the adequacy of the alterna-
tives presented by government to homeless individuals. Atkins indicated that "the rea-
sonableness of the alternatives presented to involuntarily homeless persons may become
relevant at some time in the future," once local government was in a position to claim it
was providing emergency shelter spaces sufficient to accommodate all of the city's home-
less. However, he cautioned that "[w]hile the court is concerned that homeless people re-
ceive appropriate services and are treated with dignity, it is not for the court to judge
the efficacy of the [Dade County Homeless] Trust's efforts" in offering services to persons
displaced by eradication of the homeless encampments in which they had been living.
Pottinger v. City of Miami, No. 88-2406-CIV-ATKINS (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 1995), slip op. at
8 n.7. See also Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F Supp. 344, 350 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd on
standing grounds, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995) (indicating that space on a "shelter's floor"
might be a sufficient alternative to offer a homeless person claiming involuntariness);
Mixon, 669 N.E.2d at 821 (rejecting the claim that courts can impose on the City of New
York a plan that might effectively reduce the chance that HIV-positive homeless individ-
uals would contract infectious diseases in the city shelter system).
246. See, e.g., Stephen Wizner, Homelessness: Advocacy and Social Policy, 45 U.
MIAA L REv. 387, 391 (1991) ("Legal advocates confront homelessness as an emergency
condition. It is their task to address individuals' current housing needs, not to devise
measures that may become effective for the individual or society in the future.!); Blasi,
Litigation Concerning Homeless People, supra note 43, at 442-43 (noting that although
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But the true value of litigation should be measured by the
extent to which the legal relief granted and the social programs
that follow actually and significantly improve the lives of home-
less people by dealing successfilly with their real problems. The
record has not been good.247 Reflecting on the New York City
right to shelter litigation in which he had been so central an ac-
tor, Bob Hayes has wondered:
Why in God's name should you go through five years and... millions of
dollars of legal fees to get a relatively modest victory? And what kind of
a victory? [One that has produced a system in which] one thousand
human beings sleep[ ] in one room [and] where $35,000 a year is squan-
dered on a squalid welfare hotel room.
And the more recent cases indicate that the chances of es-
tablishing even negative rights may be waning.249 Assistance
programs have developed, to some significant extent, when
courts have made unavailable the punitive police solution to
litigation to address homelessness is 'very ineffective and very inefficient ... sometimes
courtrooms are the places of last resort for the most desperate"); Abbott, supra note 206,
at 308, 313 (urging that "[tiheoretical railing against legitimation [of the existing admin-
istrative system] must take a back seat to survival" when "without the 'benefits' pro-
vided by the government, many homeless people would die.... If litigation will force a
city to adhere to statutes requiring that they provide shelter for those in need, that type
of litigation must be a priority.").
247. See, eg., Shlay & Rossi, supra note 181, at 130 ("Policies designed to amelio-
rate homelessness have been inadequate to stem the tidal forces that produce such se-
vere destitution, and this trend is likely to continue); Foscarinis, supra note 235, at 39-
43 (noting ethical issues facing lawyers working on behalf of homeless people whose ef-
forts might contribute to the "institutionalization" and "legitimization" of homelessness).
For a study of "whether, and under what conditions, courts can produce significant
social reform," see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SocIAL CHANGE? 336 (1991) (concluding that "attempts to use the courts to produce sig-
nificant social reform in civil rights, abortion, women's rights, the environment, reappor-
tionment, and criminal rights" were "mostly disappointing). See also HANDLER, supra
note 208 (analyzing thirty-five cases in which lawyers attempted to use the legal system
to achieve social change in four areas he identifies as environmental litigation, consumer
protection, civil rights and social welfare, and concluding, at 22-25, that realization of
the benefits of judicial gains was impeded by "[blureaucratic hostility" and problems of
enforcement of court-ordered remedies).
248.7. Robert M. Hayes, Honelessness & the Legal Profession, 35 Loy. L. REv. 1, 8
(1989). Hayes does believe that the litigation resulted in a 'major victory' in that New
York City was thereby pressured to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to transform
formerly abandoned buildings into livable permanent housing. Id. at 9.
249. See generally Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994); Tobe
v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal.
1995); Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994); and
Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 0396, 1996 US. Dist. LEXIS 16041 (N.D. IlM. Oct. 23,
1996).
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homelessness. Removal of the legal bar to the law enforcement
solution, then, combined with "compassion fatigue"2 0 and tax-
payer frustration, and an "increasingly hostile climate for home-
less persons,"25 1 will likely result in the continued reduction or
elimination of the programs.
So, whether or not lawyers win lawsuits using the involun-
tariness approach, meaningful solutions to the problems of
homeless individuals seem unlikely to result from those litiga-
tion efforts.
To address the situation effectively, lawyers may need to
look beyond traditional lawyers' approaches, and to strive, in di-
alogue and in concert with homeless people, for real solutions to
their real problems. 25 2
What are the alternatives? Some suggestions follow. They
require a more realistic appraisal of the causes of homelessness,
and of the nature of homeless people's life choices.
Lawyers who conclude that the helplessness strategy is the
wrong direction may want to consider a variety of
alternatives.253
One is to devise ways of refraining litigation arguments to
try to influence legal doctrine to acknowledge the autonomy that
homeless individuals exercise in a world of frighteningly limited
and inadequate choices. Can the law accommodate both a recog-
250. See, eg., Isabel Wilkerson, Shift in Feelings on the Homeless: Empathy Turns to
Frustration, N.Y. TnwEs, Sept. 2, 1991, at Al; Jill Smolowe, Giving the Cold Shoulder,
TM, Dec. 6, 1993, at 28. See also Sossin, supra note 37, at 625 (noting that "sporadic
judicial concern has been overshadowed by the larger trend of the public's 'compassion
fatigue' with homelessness... [which] mirrors a collective impatience with the state's
inability (or unwillingness) to reduce poverty through government intervention in the
form of conventional welfare programs!).
251. Takahashi, supra note 36, at 291.
252. See, eg., White, The Real Deal, supra note 9, at 312-13.
253. Lucie White has identified "three dimensions on which lawyering might be a
catalyst for social change." Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On
Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CiNIcAL L. REv. 157, 157 (1994). The
first is "advocacy which seeks to make the positive law more responsive to the social
welfare needs of socially disempowered groups" and involves litigation, lobbying and
monitoring administrative agencies. Id. The second is "advocacy which seeks to trans-
form values in dominant cultures so as to encourage greater sensitivity to the injustices
poor people face, greater respect for their life projects, and a clearer will to mobilize pub-
lic resources on their behalf through the transformation of trials and legislative ses-
sions into "educational or theatrical event[s] that [are] designed to move [their] audi-
ences to empathize with poor people and form political coalitions with them." Id. The
third dimension is "advocacy that is focused on poor people's own political consciousness"
and that "seeks to enable poor people to see themselves and their social situation in
ways that enhance their world-changing powers" while "seek[ing] to change the attitudes
and self-concepts of lawyers themselves." Id.
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nition of the agency (though limited) that homeless people exer-
cise, as well as judicial "distrust"254 of a political process that
has undemocratically produced the inequality and inhumanity
reflected in mass poverty and homelessness? 2 5 Can lawyers
craft legal arguments to achieve this result? This would require
a radical reconceptualization of both the nature of homelessness
and the legal obligations of government under existing law.
Another alternative is to participate in attempts to change
prevailing social conditions through concerted, grass-roots?5 po-
litical action, to strive to change the hearts and minds of aver-
age citizens, political policy-makers, and resource-allocators. 257
Given the current conservative, anti-poor mood of local and na-
tional legislatures,?5 the time may not seem propitious for this
kind of political action. Yet, precisely because of that backlash,
it may be even more urgent that those efforts be undertaken.
Since public opinion seems somewhat less hostile than the ac-
tions of public officials, 259 the time may be right to mount a
counter-offensive.
The alternative approaches are far from mutually exclu-
254. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
255. See Loffredo, supra note 203, at 1281, 1285 ("The polarity between democratic
ideal and economic elitism has intensified in the gecond half of the twentieth century as
... a radical maldistribution of wealth has profoundly influenced political affairs ....
[T]he political process provides little security for even the most basic interests of the
poor ... !).
256. See VANDERSTAAY, supra note 1, at 187 (advocating "cooperative, grass-root,
self-help programs that place responsibility upon homeless people while entrusting them
with the tools, services, and resources they need to better themselves").
257. See Schnably, supra note 68, at 557-58 (noting that the "invisibility" and "disci-
plinary" strategies adopted by local governments in response to homelessness both share
a "singular inattention to promoting democratic empowerment of the people they purport
to help.").
258. See, eg., Rebecca Anne Allahyari, The Micro-Politics of Worthy Homelessness:
Interactive Moments in Congressional Hearings, 67 Soc. INQumY 27 (1997) (finding, in
analyzing four Congressional hearings on homelessness held 1987-1990, examples of
members of Congress identifying as causes of homeless witnesses' homelessness "a dys-
functional psychological response to shared housing" id. at 32; an "incapacity [of home-
less veterans] to adequately establish social ties" id. at 36; and the inability of a home-
less woman with a young child to locate and seek assistance from an abusive estranged
husband. Id. at 40-41.).
259. See, eg., Blasi, And We Are Not Seen, supra note 9, at 563 (noting that al-
though there has been a "shift in elite attitudes toward homelessness ... opinion polling
data suggest that there remains in the wider public consciousness a substantial and
growing reservoir, still largely untapped, of compassion and concern about poverty and
homelessness!"). Toro & McDonell, supra note 185, at 69 (concluding that results of the
authors' and others' public opinion surveys demonstrated that there was "extensive pub-
lic support for homeless people.").
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sive.2 0 Litigation can serve a public consciousness-raising func-
tion,261 and for public interest lawyers it is "often merely a part
of a multi-pronged strategy, which might also include adminis-
trative and legislative advocacy. 262
Lawyers may want to join or form coalitions with commu-
nity activists. Together they might seek broad social change
through structural reform in such areas as employment, housing
and medical care, with a focus on the intersection of poverty,
race and gender.
Some attorneys might sign on with progressive organiza-
tions that target specific aspects of poverty and homelessness
through broad strategic initiatives. One such organization is
Housing Works, a New York City-based "community... where
homeless and formerly homeless men and women, professionals
and volunteers work side by side to improve conditions for...
[o]ver 30,000 New Yorkers with AIDS and lIV currently liv[ing]
in shelters, on the streets or in severely inadequate housing."263
The group attacks the problem on a number of fronts, pro-
viding housing programs, supportive services (such as peer sup-
port, life skills training, nutritional counseling and parenting
education), job training and literacy classes, alternatives to
traditional drug treatment programs, and a tuberculosis preven-
tion and control program. Prominent among its goals is to "as-
260. As the lawyer who brought the landmark Callahan case has suggested, "litiga-
tion is just a process toward winning the hearts and minds of a majority of the voters"
Hayes, supra note 248, at 10. "[O]n the most fundamental level, courts depend on politi-
cal support to produce [significant social] reform." Rosenberg, supra note 247, at 336.
"Lawyers representing homeless people have an obligation to press for broad reform in
order to further our clients' fundamental goal" of escaping homelessness. Foscarinis, Be-
yond Homelessness, supra note 235, at 67.
261. "Lawyers ... file cases in court to encourage debate on important social issues
as much as they do to achieve results for their particular clients" Abbott, supra note
206, at 305 (citing, as an example of a source supporting this assertion, Martha Minow,
Law and Social Change, 62 UMKC L. REv. 171, 173 (1993)). See also Barbara Sard, The
Role of the Courts in Welfare Reform, LITIGATION, at 115 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 428, 1992) ("It is clear that where increased welfare bene-
fits are concerned, an 'elite' legal strategy can only be an accompaniment to, and not a
substitute for, a broad-based movement.").
262. Abbott, supra note 206, at 306 (citing Harold A. McDougall, Lawyering and
Public Policy, 38 J. LEG. EDuc. 369, 382-83 (1988)). Some lawyers and law students have
joined the attack on homelessness in another traditional role, outside the litigation con-
text: transactional lawyering. See, eg., Rebecca Arbogast et al., Revitalizing Public Inter-
est Lawyering in the 1990s: The Story of One Effort to Address the Problem of Homeless-
ness, 34 How. L.J. 91 (1991) (describing clinical program at Yale Law School that helped
community organizations build affordable housing in New Haven).
263. What is Housing Works?, Oct. 23, 1997, <http://www.housingworks.org/
about.htm> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review).
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sist[] clients to advocate for themselves with landlords and pub-
lic agencies."26
Housing Works "provides legal services for individual clients
and also advocates the systemic changes necessary to ensure
that all persons with HIV/AIDS have access to housing and ser-
vices. " 265 One of its goals is "to have clients direct advocacy ef-
forts and to coordinate individual and impact advocacy as sys-
temic problems are identified from the barriers faced by
individual clients."266
What is essential is the involvement of homeless people
themselves. 267 They are "not . . . inert or completely beaten
down."268 "[T]he most salient characteristic of the solutions
homeless people seek for themselves [is] the desire to help each
other.... [T]his sense of alliances is much more than a vague
wish for togetherness or cooperation: it is a strategic response to
perilous conditions."269
Only homeless people can truly comprehend the realities of
homelessness. Positive change in their life conditions is unlikely
to result from discussions and decisions in which they do not
take the lead, or even participate.270
264. Id.
265. Shubert & Hombs, supra note 206, at 748.
266. Id.
267. See Schnably, supra note 68, at 559 (advocating "the development of a political
identity through collective self-assertion and mobilization of homeless people them-
selves."). See also Abbott, supra note 206, at 287-88 (urging that "critical lawyers should
engage clients in a collaborative process intended to achieve broader goals than a court
victory."). Abbott, however, doubts that homeless people are capable of participating ef-
fectively in this process. Id. at 289.
Buchanan and Trubek urge public interest lawyers to adopt a number of tenets of
the "critical lawyering vision," including:
encourag[ing] participation of clients ... in practice decisions;... seek(ing] to
access client experiences regarding strategies for struggle and resistance; de-
veloping] a healthy skepticism regarding traditional advocacy arenas; continu-
ally re-evaluat[ing] advocacy effectiveness from a client perspective[;] en-
courag[ing] organization and collective efforts by clients; [and] working with
existing social movements and client groups.
Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practi.
cal Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 687, 691 (1992).
268. Schnably, supra note 68, at 569.
269. VANDERSTAAY, supra note 1, at 185.
270. See Thompson, supra note 236, at 658-59 (attributing the "failure" of "liberal
homeless policy" in New York City in part to homeless advocates having pursued "an
elite court and media-centered strategy that politically isolated the homeless.").
Commentators have critiqued the tendency of lawyers for poor and subordinated
people to believe they best know how to interpret and pursue their clients' interests. See
Alfieri, supra note 7, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 619 (1991); White, Subordination, supra note 7.
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Many advocates work tirelessly to bring relief to the lives of
those who suffer greatly. They often feel deep frustration when
their efforts do not achieve the results they seek. The cause is
noble, the effort sincere. This Article is an attempt to suggest
some different directions, in the hope that suffering and frustra-
tion might thereby be reduced.
Gerald Lopez has applied the term "regnant" to a style of lawyering in which law-
yers act as "self-styled 'political heroes' [and] 'preeminent problem-solvers,' rushing to
cure situations of injustice, even though they know little about the cultural, political,
and socioeconomic structures of subordination and 'try little to learn whether and how
formal changes in law penetrate the lives of subordinated people." Anthony V. Alfieri,
Practicing Community, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1753-54 (1994) (reviewing GERALD P. Lo-
PEZ, REBELuOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992)).
Regnant lawyering "rationalizes client helplessness" and "relegate[s] clients to roles of
passivity and obedience." Id. at 1754. Alfieri believes that "[for advocates in civil rights
and poverty law contexts, the received tradition of practice constructs clients as victims.
This construction reduces clients to powerless and pathological objects." Id. at 1761. He
illustrates and analyzes lawyers' use of the "victimization strategy" in the disability con-
text in Anthony Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HAsTINGs L.J. 769, 811-
28 (1992). He suggests, in its place, an "enabling strategy," based on alternative "struc-
ture-transforming" and "context-transforming" practices. Id. at 828-48. For a recent ex-
ample of legal scholarship that reflects the regnant lawyering approach in the homeless-
ness context, see Abbott, supra note 206, at 301 (stating that "[a] homeless person.may
require an advocate's assistance at the preliminary stage of identifying the nature of his
or her difficulties and recognizing that the legal system may be of help in solving those
problems."). Abbott also believes that many homeless people
often experience a sense of alienation from society as a whole[;] take their situ-
ation for granted[;] are resigned to their status[;] find it difficult to attribute
specific blame for their homelessness[; and even when they are] able to attri-
bute blame [are] likely to find the process of confronting the allegedly responsi-
ble party and making a claim for redress an insurmountable burden.... Thus,
the particular characteristics of homelessness present significant problems in
applying critical lawyering theories which encourage lawyers to go beyond
rights-based theories and to assist the client in becoming a fully-empowered
partner in remedying the problem.
Id. at 302-304. Abbott nevertheless also endorses "allowing clients to tell their own sto-
ries." Id. at 312.

